Japan in Transition

Institutions, Culture, and Transformation from Tokugawa to the Twenty-First Century

Author

Affiliation

HEC Montréal

Published

July 11, 2025

Introduction

Japan presents a complex case of a modern nation at the nexus of historical legacy and unprecedented demographic change. As one of the world’s largest economies (with a GDP of around $4.2 trillion in recent years), Japan today is a highly developed society known for its unique culture and robust institutions. From its rapid industrialization in the late 19th and 20th centuries to its position as a global business leader, Japan’s trajectory has been remarkable. Yet, alongside economic and social achievements, the country now faces profound demographic challenges. An aging population, persistently low birth rates, and a shrinking workforce have combined to create a demographic profile unlike that of any other major economy. Japan’s population is not only declining in size, it is by far the oldest in the world: the median age is about 48–49 years, and nearly 30% of Japanese citizens are age 65 or above. This introduction provides an overview of Japan’s history, culture, institutions, business environment, and society through the lens of these demographic changes. It offers necessary historical context for understanding contemporary Japan and underscores how demographic trends—especially population aging, low fertility, and workforce shrinkage—are shaping Japan’s institutions, business climate, and social structures. In doing so, it sets the stage for the more detailed explorations in subsequent chapters.

Historical and Demographic Context

Modern Japan’s demographic evolution is rooted in its historical development. During the Meiji Restoration period (starting 1868), Japan underwent rapid modernization, and its population grew markedly as public health and economic conditions improved. In the early Meiji era, Japan’s population was roughly 35 million; it surpassed 50 million by the 1920s and 60 million by mid-century. After World War II, a baby boom and continuing improvements in health and living standards fueled further growth. The total population topped 100 million in the late 1960s amid the postwar “economic miracle,” eventually reaching a peak in the 2000s. Japan’s population peaked around 2008 at approximately 128 million before entering a long-anticipated decline. This turning point marked the end of an era of demographic expansion and the beginning of a new phase characterized by zero growth and then net decrease in population. The combination of declining fertility rates and increasing longevity led to a rapidly aging population and the plateauing of population size by the end of the 20th century. By 2010, Japan had essentially stopped growing in population; since then it has been shrinking each year as deaths outnumber births.

Long-term trends in Japan’s population (in millions) from historic times to present, with future projections. Japan’s population climbed steeply in the 20th century (peaking at just over 128 million around 2010) and is projected to decline to mid-20th-century levels by 2050, given low birth rates and an aging populace. The proportion of elderly (65+) in the population has risen dramatically (over one-quarter by 2015 and still climbing), reflecting Japan’s status as the world’s most aged society.

The demographic shifts confronting Japan today are stark. Japan’s population is aging and shrinking faster than that of any other major nation. Total population stood at roughly 125 million in 2020 and is projected to fall by over one-quarter within 40 years – a loss equivalent to the entire population of a mid-sized country. Official projections forecast a decline to below 100 million by around 2050 if current trends persist. Perhaps more critically, the age structure of the population has skewed heavily toward older cohorts. As of the late 2010s, people aged 65 and above accounted for about 28% of the populace, and by 2023 this figure was nearly one-third. Japan was the first country to become a “super-aged” society (defined as over 20% of citizens above 65), and it continues to break new ground: more than one in every ten Japanese is now 80 years or older. In contrast, the younger population is dwindling. The total fertility rate has remained around 1.3 children per woman in recent years, far below the replacement level of 2.1 needed to maintain a stable population. Births hit record lows year after year, resulting in natural population declines that have no precedent in Japan’s modern history. The working-age population (typically ages 15–64) is not only a smaller share of society than before, but is also absolutely shrinking – a trend that will accelerate as large cohorts retire. Government projections suggest that by 2060 there could be almost one elderly person for every person of working age in Japan, a dramatic inversion of the population pyramid. In short, Japan has transitioned from a growing, youthful society to an aging, declining one within just a few decades. This demographic context is crucial for understanding contemporary Japan’s economic, institutional, and social dynamics.

Demographic Trends and Their Implications

The implications of Japan’s demographic trends reverberate across its institutions, business environment, and social structures. The aging population has profound consequences for Japan’s institutions, particularly the systems of social security, healthcare, and governance. A larger elderly population means rising expenditures on pensions, medical care, and long-term care services. Indeed, the government faces mounting pressure on public finances as age-related spending soars while the tax base shrinks. Analysts warn that an aging and shrinking populace will strain Japan’s public finances, with one IMF estimate projecting that demographic factors alone could reduce Japan’s economic growth by about 0.8 percentage points annually over the next 40 years. Policymakers have recognized the gravity of the situation: Japan’s leaders increasingly describe the demographic challenge in urgent terms. Prime Minister Fumio Kishida warned in 2023 that Japan is “standing on the verge of whether we can continue to function as a society” if current birth and aging trends persist. Consequently, institutional reforms are being pursued to mitigate these trends. The government has pledged to create a “children-first economic society” to halt the birthrate decline, proposing measures such as enhanced child allowances, expanded childcare services, and educational support. At the same time, policy efforts aim to adapt to an aging populace by raising the retirement age and encouraging seniors to remain economically active. For example, Japan has already passed legislation to allow (and implicitly encourage) companies to retain employees until age 70, moving beyond the traditional retirement age of 60–65. Breaking down labor market practices that discourage older or female employment is now a priority. Japan has also historically been cautious with immigration, but labor shortages are prompting gradual shifts in this arena as well. In recent years, the government has slightly relaxed immigration rules to attract foreign workers in sectors facing acute labor shortfalls, though Japan remains far less open to immigration compared to other advanced economies. These institutional responses reflect how deeply demographic change is testing Japan’s policy framework, from pension system sustainability to the very makeup of its workforce.

The business environment in Japan is equally affected by demographic shifts. A shrinking workforce poses challenges to economic growth and corporate operations. Japanese companies have been coping with labor shortages by various means, including greater reliance on older workers and technological innovation. By 2022, almost half of Japanese firms were relying on employees over the age of 70 to fill labor needs, a striking indicator of how the definition of “retirement age” is being stretched in practice. This contrasts with global trends – for instance, most companies worldwide have been slower to tap the over-70 workforce – and underscores Japan’s unique position at the forefront of population aging. In addition to human resource adaptations, businesses are investing in productivity enhancements and automation. Japan’s famed prowess in robotics and automation is, in part, a response to its demographic pressures. With fewer young workers available, many industries are accelerating the deployment of artificial intelligence, robotics, and labor-saving technologies to maintain output. This phenomenon has been described as Japan turning a potential crisis into an opportunity: its demographic reality is spurring innovation in fields like healthcare technology, eldercare robotics, and process automation, potentially positioning Japanese firms as global leaders in these emerging markets. Moreover, demographic change is reshaping consumer markets. As Japan’s population ages, the consumer base skews older, leading to the expansion of so-called “silver markets.” Enterprises are devising new products and services tailored to senior consumers – from healthcare and wellness services to age-friendly home technologies and leisure products for the elderly. An expanding elderly population with significant spending power (many of today’s Japanese seniors are relatively affluent by global standards) creates new business opportunities in sectors like medical technology, financial services for retirement, and travel or recreation geared towards retirees. At the same time, businesses must navigate challenges such as a decline in the youth market and changing labor practices (for example, the need for more flexible work arrangements to accommodate older or second-career workers). Overall, Japan’s business landscape is in a period of adaptation, finding ways to sustain economic vitality in the face of a contracting workforce and shifting demand patterns. Notably, despite decades of demographic headwinds, Japan remains a top global economy – a testament to the resilience of its firms and institutions, albeit one that raises questions about how long such performance can be maintained without significant demographic or productivity improvements.

The social and cultural structures of Japan are also undergoing transformation under demographic pressures. One significant aspect is the changing family and household composition. With people living longer and youth populations smaller, Japan now has many more elderly-only households and single-person elderly households. By 2019, fully half of all Japanese households had at least one member aged 65 or older, and a considerable number of seniors live alone (in 2020, about 22% of women over 65 and 15% of men over 65 were living by themselves). These patterns represent a shift from the traditional three-generation family model that was once common. The erosion of the extended family as the primary care unit for the aged places new strains on social services and community support networks. Indeed, elder care has become a pressing social issue: the demand for caregivers and healthcare workers has surged, and communities are experimenting with volunteer networks, “retirement community” models, and even robot-assisted care to support their seniors. Geographic distribution of the population is another concern. Rural depopulation is accelerating as younger people migrate to cities and birth rates in the countryside plummet. Many rural villages and small towns have been left with high concentrations of elderly residents and very few working-age people to provide services or carry on local businesses. This has led to phenomena such as closed schools, abandoned homes, and shrinking local economies outside the major urban centers. Culturally, the demographic shifts intersect with long-standing norms and societal expectations. For example, the persistently low fertility rate is not merely a statistical trend but is rooted in social factors: young Japanese are marrying later in life and having fewer children, influenced by economic insecurity and demanding work cultures. Surveys and studies indicate that many couples have fewer children than they desire, citing the high cost of child-rearing and difficulties in balancing work and family life. Traditional gender roles in both the workplace and home have contributed to this dilemma. Although Japan has implemented family-friendly policies on paper (such as parental leave and child care support), cultural expectations often compel women to choose between a career and motherhood. The result has been a delay or decline in marriage and childbirth, as dual-income urban couples weigh the trade-offs, and as more individuals remain single by choice or circumstance. Japanese society is gradually adapting – attitudes toward work-life balance and gender roles are slowly shifting among the younger generation – but these changes have yet to significantly lift the birthrate. Meanwhile, the aging society has cultural implications as well: the veneration of elders is a strong value in Japan, which may facilitate community support for the elderly, but it also means that political power and social priorities often cater to senior citizens (given that older voters form a large voting bloc). This dynamic can sometimes lead to intergenerational tensions or policy debates about how to equitably distribute resources between the young and old. Japan’s demographic changes are reshaping its social fabric – altering how people live, interact, and envision their futures – in ways that are both challenging and transformative for the culture.

Conclusion

Japan’s experience in navigating the interplay of demography, economy, and society offers critical insights for other nations facing similar trends. The country’s history of resilience – from post-war reconstruction to economic modernization – now enters a new chapter where adaptation to demographic realities is paramount. Contemporary Japan, with its aging population and low birth rate, stands at a crossroads that tests the adaptability of its cultural norms and the flexibility of its institutions. This introduction has outlined how Japan’s demographic trajectory over time provides essential context for understanding its current challenges in governance, business, and community life. The implications of an aging, shrinking population touch virtually every aspect of Japan’s national life: from government budgets and corporate strategies to family structures and cultural values. As the first “super-aged” society in modern history, Japan is in many ways a bellwether – a “laboratory” from which other countries may draw lessons. The following chapters of this book will delve deeper into Japan’s history, culture, institutions, business environment, and societal change, examining each through an academic lens. They will explore how Japan’s government and businesses are responding to demographic pressures, how social and cultural patterns are evolving in response, and what Japan’s case indicates for the future of global aging. Through an MBA-level analysis that is both rigorous and nuanced, this book will shed light on how a great nation is striving to turn the challenges of demographic change into opportunities for innovation and sustainable development. Japan’s story – past and present – thus not only contextualizes its current demographic trials but also provides a framework for understanding the broader relationship between population dynamics and the trajectory of business and society in the 21st century.

References

Edmond, C., & North, M. (2023, September 28). More than 1 in 10 people in Japan are now aged 80 or older. Here’s how its ageing population is reshaping the country. World Economic Forum. (Data on aging workforce and demographic context)

Hoshi, T. (2018, February 8). Japan’s Demographic Advantages. Tokyo Foundation for Policy Research. (Historical population growth and long-term demographic outlook)

International Monetary Fund (IMF). (2020, February 10). Japan: Demographic Shift Opens Door to Reforms. IMF News Article. (Overview of Japan’s demographic challenges and economic implications)

Jones, R. S. (2024). Addressing demographic headwinds in Japan: A long-term perspective. OECD Economics Department Working Paper No. 1792. OECD Publishing. (Analysis of fertility, labor participation, and policy measures)

Nakatani, H. (2019). Population aging in Japan: Policy transformation, sustainable development goals, universal health coverage, and social determinants of health. Global Health & Medicine, 1(1), 3–10. (Statistics on aging and population projections)

Ono, Y., & Uchikoshi, F. (2023). “Lowest-low Fertility” & Gender Inequality: Japan from a Comparative Perspective. Tokyo Foundation / Japan Spotlight. (Discussion of cultural expectations and low fertility in Japan)

Parker, C. (2022, June 3). Japan records its largest natural population decline as births fall. The Washington Post. (Recent demographic statistics: birth rate, fertility, aging population)

Suzuki, Y. (2023). Impact of Japan’s Aging Population in 2030 – Focusing on the Effect on the Social Security System and Local Economies. Mitsui & Co. Global Strategic Studies Institute Report. (Data on population peak and aging trends)

Kushida, K. E. (2024, October 3). Japan’s Aging Society as a Technological Opportunity. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (Insights on technological and regional responses to demographic challenges)

Citing this book

The full reference is:

BibTeX:

@book{gsdsqr,
  author = {Thierry Warin},
  year = 2025,
  title = {Japan},
  publisher = {Forthcoming},
  address = {Forthcoming},
  URL = {https://warin.ca/japan},
  doi = {Your DOI (if available)}
}

Acknowledgements

A special thanks goes to my MBA students at HEC Montreal, whose insights, enthusiasm, and questions during our sessions have greatly enriched this book. Your contributions, whether through discussion, feedback, or collaboration, have been invaluable, and I am deeply grateful for your support.

# Introduction {.unnumbered} Japan presents a complex case of a modern nation at the nexus of historical legacy and unprecedented demographic change. As one of the world’s largest economies (with a GDP of around \$4.2 trillion in recent years), Japan today is a highly developed society known for its unique culture and robust institutions. From its rapid industrialization in the late 19th and 20th centuries to its position as a global business leader, Japan’s trajectory has been remarkable. Yet, alongside economic and social achievements, the country now faces profound demographic challenges. An aging population, persistently low birth rates, and a shrinking workforce have combined to create a demographic profile unlike that of any other major economy. Japan’s population is not only declining in size, it is *by far* the oldest in the world: the median age is about 48–49 years, and nearly 30% of Japanese citizens are age 65 or above. This introduction provides an overview of Japan’s history, culture, institutions, business environment, and society through the lens of these demographic changes. It offers necessary historical context for understanding contemporary Japan and underscores how demographic trends—especially population aging, low fertility, and workforce shrinkage—are shaping Japan’s institutions, business climate, and social structures. In doing so, it sets the stage for the more detailed explorations in subsequent chapters. ## Historical and Demographic Context Modern Japan’s demographic evolution is rooted in its historical development. During the Meiji Restoration period (starting 1868), Japan underwent rapid modernization, and its population grew markedly as public health and economic conditions improved. In the early Meiji era, Japan’s population was roughly 35 million; it surpassed 50 million by the 1920s and 60 million by mid-century. After World War II, a baby boom and continuing improvements in health and living standards fueled further growth. The total population topped 100 million in the late 1960s amid the postwar “economic miracle,” eventually reaching a peak in the 2000s. Japan’s population **peaked around 2008 at approximately 128 million** before entering a long-anticipated decline. This turning point marked the end of an era of demographic expansion and the beginning of a new phase characterized by zero growth and then net decrease in population. The combination of *declining fertility rates* and *increasing longevity* led to a rapidly aging population and the plateauing of population size by the end of the 20th century. By 2010, Japan had essentially stopped growing in population; since then it has been **shrinking each year** as deaths outnumber births.  *Long-term trends in Japan’s population (in millions) from historic times to present, with future projections. Japan’s population climbed steeply in the 20th century (peaking at just over 128 million around 2010) and is projected to decline to mid-20th-century levels by 2050, given **low birth rates** and **an aging populace**. The proportion of elderly (65+) in the population has risen dramatically (over one-quarter by 2015 and still climbing), reflecting Japan’s status as the world’s most aged society.* The demographic shifts confronting Japan today are stark. **Japan’s population is aging and shrinking faster than that of any other major nation**. Total population stood at roughly 125 million in 2020 and is projected to fall by over one-quarter within 40 years – a loss equivalent to the entire population of a mid-sized country. Official projections forecast a decline to below 100 million by around 2050 if current trends persist. Perhaps more critically, the *age structure* of the population has skewed heavily toward older cohorts. As of the late 2010s, people aged 65 and above accounted for about 28% of the populace, and by 2023 this figure was nearly one-third. Japan was the first country to become a “super-aged” society (defined as over 20% of citizens above 65), and it continues to break new ground: more than one in every ten Japanese is now 80 years or older. In contrast, the younger population is dwindling. The **total fertility rate** has remained around **1.3 children per woman in recent years**, far below the replacement level of 2.1 needed to maintain a stable population. Births hit record lows year after year, resulting in natural population declines that have no precedent in Japan’s modern history. The working-age population (typically ages 15–64) is not only a smaller share of society than before, but is also absolutely shrinking – a trend that will accelerate as large cohorts retire. Government projections suggest that by 2060 there could be almost one elderly person for every person of working age in Japan, a dramatic inversion of the population pyramid. In short, Japan has transitioned from a growing, youthful society to an **aging, declining** one within just a few decades. This demographic context is crucial for understanding contemporary Japan’s economic, institutional, and social dynamics. ## Demographic Trends and Their Implications The implications of Japan’s demographic trends reverberate across its **institutions, business environment, and social structures**. The aging population has profound consequences for Japan’s **institutions**, particularly the systems of social security, healthcare, and governance. A larger elderly population means rising expenditures on pensions, medical care, and long-term care services. Indeed, the government faces mounting pressure on public finances as age-related spending soars while the tax base shrinks. Analysts warn that an aging and shrinking populace will **strain Japan’s public finances**, with one IMF estimate projecting that demographic factors alone could reduce Japan’s economic growth by about 0.8 percentage points annually over the next 40 years. Policymakers have recognized the gravity of the situation: Japan’s leaders increasingly describe the demographic challenge in urgent terms. Prime Minister Fumio Kishida warned in 2023 that Japan is “*standing on the verge of whether we can continue to function as a society*” if current birth and aging trends persist. Consequently, institutional reforms are being pursued to mitigate these trends. The government has pledged to create a “children-first economic society” to **halt the birthrate decline**, proposing measures such as enhanced child allowances, expanded childcare services, and educational support. At the same time, policy efforts aim to adapt to an aging populace by **raising the retirement age** and encouraging seniors to remain economically active. For example, Japan has already passed legislation to allow (and implicitly encourage) companies to retain employees until age 70, moving beyond the traditional retirement age of 60–65. Breaking down labor market practices that discourage older or female employment is now a priority. Japan has also historically been cautious with immigration, but labor shortages are prompting gradual shifts in this arena as well. In recent years, the government has slightly relaxed immigration rules to attract foreign workers in sectors facing acute labor shortfalls, though Japan remains far less open to immigration compared to other advanced economies. These institutional responses reflect how deeply demographic change is testing Japan’s policy framework, from **pension system sustainability** to the very makeup of its workforce. The **business environment** in Japan is equally affected by demographic shifts. A **shrinking workforce** poses challenges to economic growth and corporate operations. Japanese companies have been coping with labor shortages by various means, including greater reliance on older workers and technological innovation. By 2022, almost **half of Japanese firms were relying on employees over the age of 70** to fill labor needs, a striking indicator of how the definition of “retirement age” is being stretched in practice. This contrasts with global trends – for instance, most companies worldwide have been slower to tap the over-70 workforce – and underscores Japan’s unique position at the forefront of population aging. In addition to human resource adaptations, businesses are investing in productivity enhancements and automation. Japan’s famed prowess in robotics and automation is, in part, a **response to its demographic pressures**. With fewer young workers available, many industries are accelerating the deployment of artificial intelligence, robotics, and labor-saving technologies to maintain output. This phenomenon has been described as Japan turning a potential crisis into an opportunity: its demographic reality is spurring innovation in fields like healthcare technology, eldercare robotics, and process automation, potentially positioning Japanese firms as global leaders in these emerging markets. Moreover, demographic change is reshaping **consumer markets**. As Japan’s population ages, the consumer base skews older, leading to the expansion of so-called “silver markets.” Enterprises are devising new products and services tailored to senior consumers – from healthcare and wellness services to age-friendly home technologies and leisure products for the elderly. An expanding elderly population with significant spending power (many of today’s Japanese seniors are relatively affluent by global standards) creates **new business opportunities** in sectors like medical technology, financial services for retirement, and travel or recreation geared towards retirees. At the same time, businesses must navigate challenges such as a decline in the youth market and changing labor practices (for example, the need for more flexible work arrangements to accommodate older or second-career workers). Overall, Japan’s business landscape is in a period of adaptation, finding ways to sustain economic vitality in the face of a contracting workforce and shifting demand patterns. Notably, despite decades of demographic headwinds, Japan remains a top global economy – a testament to the resilience of its firms and institutions, albeit one that raises questions about how long such performance can be maintained without significant demographic or productivity improvements. The **social and cultural structures** of Japan are also undergoing transformation under demographic pressures. One significant aspect is the changing family and household composition. With people living longer and youth populations smaller, Japan now has many more **elderly-only households** and single-person elderly households. By 2019, fully **half of all Japanese households had at least one member aged 65 or older**, and a considerable number of seniors live alone (in 2020, about 22% of women over 65 and 15% of men over 65 were living by themselves). These patterns represent a shift from the traditional three-generation family model that was once common. The erosion of the extended family as the primary care unit for the aged places new strains on social services and community support networks. Indeed, **elder care** has become a pressing social issue: the demand for caregivers and healthcare workers has surged, and communities are experimenting with volunteer networks, “retirement community” models, and even robot-assisted care to support their seniors. Geographic distribution of the population is another concern. **Rural depopulation** is accelerating as younger people migrate to cities and birth rates in the countryside plummet. Many rural villages and small towns have been left with *high concentrations of elderly residents* and very few working-age people to provide services or carry on local businesses. This has led to phenomena such as closed schools, abandoned homes, and shrinking local economies outside the major urban centers. Culturally, the demographic shifts intersect with long-standing norms and societal expectations. For example, the **persistently low fertility rate** is not merely a statistical trend but is rooted in social factors: young Japanese are marrying later in life and having fewer children, influenced by economic insecurity and demanding work cultures. Surveys and studies indicate that many couples have fewer children than they desire, citing the high cost of child-rearing and difficulties in balancing work and family life. Traditional gender roles in both the workplace and home have contributed to this dilemma. Although Japan has implemented family-friendly policies on paper (such as parental leave and child care support), cultural expectations often compel women to choose between a career and motherhood. The result has been a **delay or decline in marriage and childbirth**, as dual-income urban couples weigh the trade-offs, and as more individuals remain single by choice or circumstance. Japanese society is gradually adapting – attitudes toward work-life balance and gender roles are slowly shifting among the younger generation – but these changes have yet to significantly lift the birthrate. Meanwhile, the **aging society** has cultural implications as well: the veneration of elders is a strong value in Japan, which may facilitate community support for the elderly, but it also means that political power and social priorities often cater to senior citizens (given that older voters form a large voting bloc). This dynamic can sometimes lead to intergenerational tensions or policy debates about how to equitably distribute resources between the young and old. Japan’s demographic changes are reshaping its social fabric – altering how people live, interact, and envision their futures – in ways that are both challenging and transformative for the culture. ## Conclusion Japan’s experience in navigating the interplay of **demography, economy, and society** offers critical insights for other nations facing similar trends. The country’s history of resilience – from post-war reconstruction to economic modernization – now enters a new chapter where adaptation to demographic realities is paramount. Contemporary Japan, with its **aging population and low birth rate**, stands at a crossroads that tests the adaptability of its cultural norms and the flexibility of its institutions. This introduction has outlined how Japan’s demographic trajectory over time provides essential context for understanding its current challenges in governance, business, and community life. The implications of an aging, shrinking population touch virtually every aspect of Japan’s national life: from government budgets and corporate strategies to family structures and cultural values. As the **first “super-aged” society** in modern history, Japan is in many ways a bellwether – a “laboratory” from which other countries may draw lessons. The following chapters of this book will delve deeper into Japan’s history, culture, institutions, business environment, and societal change, examining each through an academic lens. They will explore how Japan’s government and businesses are responding to demographic pressures, how social and cultural patterns are evolving in response, and what Japan’s case indicates for the future of global aging. Through an MBA-level analysis that is both rigorous and nuanced, this book will shed light on how a great nation is striving to turn the challenges of demographic change into opportunities for innovation and sustainable development. Japan’s story – past and present – thus not only contextualizes its current demographic trials but also provides a framework for understanding the broader relationship between population dynamics and the trajectory of business and society in the 21st century. **References** Edmond, C., & North, M. (2023, September 28). *More than 1 in 10 people in Japan are now aged 80 or older. Here’s how its ageing population is reshaping the country.* World Economic Forum. (Data on aging workforce and demographic context) Hoshi, T. (2018, February 8). *Japan’s Demographic Advantages.* Tokyo Foundation for Policy Research. (Historical population growth and long-term demographic outlook) International Monetary Fund (IMF). (2020, February 10). *Japan: Demographic Shift Opens Door to Reforms.* IMF News Article. (Overview of Japan’s demographic challenges and economic implications) Jones, R. S. (2024). *Addressing demographic headwinds in Japan: A long-term perspective.* OECD Economics Department Working Paper No. 1792. OECD Publishing. (Analysis of fertility, labor participation, and policy measures) Nakatani, H. (2019). *Population aging in Japan: Policy transformation, sustainable development goals, universal health coverage, and social determinants of health.* Global Health & Medicine, 1(1), 3–10. (Statistics on aging and population projections) Ono, Y., & Uchikoshi, F. (2023). *“Lowest-low Fertility” & Gender Inequality: Japan from a Comparative Perspective.* Tokyo Foundation / Japan Spotlight. (Discussion of cultural expectations and low fertility in Japan) Parker, C. (2022, June 3). *Japan records its largest natural population decline as births fall.* The Washington Post. (Recent demographic statistics: birth rate, fertility, aging population) Suzuki, Y. (2023). *Impact of Japan’s Aging Population in 2030 – Focusing on the Effect on the Social Security System and Local Economies.* Mitsui & Co. Global Strategic Studies Institute Report. (Data on population peak and aging trends) Kushida, K. E. (2024, October 3). *Japan’s Aging Society as a Technological Opportunity.* Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (Insights on technological and regional responses to demographic challenges) ::: {.content-visible when-format="html"} ## Citing this book The full reference is: BibTeX: ``` @book{gsdsqr, author = {Thierry Warin}, year = 2025, title = {Japan}, publisher = {Forthcoming}, address = {Forthcoming}, URL = {https://warin.ca/japan}, doi = {Your DOI (if available)} } ``` ::: ## Acknowledgements {-} A special thanks goes to my MBA students at HEC Montreal, whose insights, enthusiasm, and questions during our sessions have greatly enriched this book. Your contributions, whether through discussion, feedback, or collaboration, have been invaluable, and I am deeply grateful for your support.