12  Sustainability, Civil Society, and Social Cohesion in Contemporary Japan

Japan faces a complex interplay of environmental, social, and civic challenges as it navigates the 21st century. In recent decades, Japan has pursued ambitious sustainability initiatives, grappled with maintaining quality of life amid economic and demographic shifts, experienced an evolution in civil society and civic engagement, and confronted structural social issues like rising inequality, loneliness, and weakening community ties. This chapter examines these interrelated dimensions with historical context and contemporary developments, highlighting policy responses and business practices, and drawing comparisons with Germany, South Korea, and the United States. The analysis provides an MBA-level perspective on how Japan’s institutions and society are adapting to ensure sustainable development and social cohesion.

12.1 Environmental Policy and Sustainability Initiatives

Japan has long recognized the importance of environmental sustainability, from its early battles against industrial pollution in the 1960s to its current climate change commitments. As a signatory of the Kyoto Protocol (1997) and the Paris Agreement (2015), Japan set targets to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In 2020, the government pledged to reach net-zero carbon emissions by 2050, raising its 2030 reduction target to a 46% cut from 2013 levels. Japan has made some progress: total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions fell by about 19% from 2013 to 2022, indicating a decoupling of environmental pressure from economic growth. However, its energy mix remains carbon-intensive. After the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster, Japan shut down most of its nuclear plants and increased reliance on fossil fuels, especially imported coal and natural gas. This shift caused a short-term rise in emissions and left Japan with a high reliance on fossil fuels and low energy self-sufficiency, posing a challenge to decarbonization. Coal still accounts for nearly 30% of Japan’s power generation, and phasing out inefficient coal plants is a pressing task. The government’s recent “Green Transformation (GX)” strategy in 2023 calls for accelerating renewable energy deployment, hydrogen fuel development, and energy efficiency to meet climate goals.

CO2 emissions per capita have gradually declined in Japan since 1990, but remain higher than many peers. This chart compares per-person CO2 emissions in Japan and three peer countries. Japan’s per capita emissions (around 9 metric tons in 1990) have modestly decreased to roughly 8 tons by 2020. Germany saw a sharper decline over the period (from ~12 to 8 tons) due to reunification and a shift to renewables, while the U.S. remains higher (down from ~20 to ~15 tons per capita). South Korea’s emissions rose steeply (from ~5 to ~12 tons) as it industrialized, now surpassing Japan. Japan’s trajectory reflects some progress, but faster cuts are needed to reach its net-zero pledge.

To reach its targets, Japan is investing in renewable energy (especially solar and offshore wind), fuel cell and battery technologies, and considering carbon pricing mechanisms. Dozens of major Japanese corporations have joined international initiatives like RE100, committing to 100% renewable electricity in their operations. At the same time, Japan is focusing on climate adaptation and disaster resilience, given its frequent typhoons, floods, and heatwaves. The country has built robust capacity for climate adaptation and involved the private sector in biodiversity conservation. However, further policy measures are urged: the OECD recommends Japan implement binding carbon budgets and an independent climate policy advisory body to keep emissions on track. There is also a need to move away from fossil fuel subsidies – Japan has been criticized for financing fossil fuel projects abroad and for an energy price stabilization scheme that emerged during recent fuel price spikes. Redirecting such support toward renewable energy and energy efficiency would better align with sustainability goals.

Beyond climate change, Japan’s environmental agenda includes waste management and resource circularity. The country is known for meticulous waste sorting and high recycling rates in certain areas, yet plastic recycling remains relatively low (around 20%) and Japan’s per-capita plastic waste is among the highest globally. Policies to curb single-use plastics have been introduced (e.g. retail plastic bag fees) and efforts are underway to promote a circular economy. Japan also faces biodiversity challenges; its dense population and development pressure threaten ecosystems. The government has designated marine and forest conservation areas and encourages satoyama (traditional rural landscape) preservation, partnering with NGOs and communities for local environmental stewardship.

Comparative Perspective: Japan’s environmental performance is mixed compared to its peers. Germany has aggressively pursued Energiewende (energy transition), phasing out nuclear power and targeting a renewables share of 80% by 2030 – resulting in renewables already supplying over 40% of its electricity (though Germany’s 2022 coal resurgence and complete nuclear shutdown pose new challenges). South Korea, like Japan, relies heavily on fossil fuels and has been slower to adopt renewables, but it announced a Green New Deal investing in green infrastructure and aims for carbon neutrality by 2050. The United States has varied by administration: after withdrawing from the Paris Agreement in 2017 and then rejoining, the U.S. has recently passed major climate legislation (the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act) to boost clean energy. In terms of emissions trends, Europe (exemplified by Germany) has outpaced Japan in cutting emissions, while the U.S. saw declines in the power sector (shifting from coal to gas and renewables) but remains one of the highest per-capita emitters. Japan’s challenge is to accelerate its transition – increasing renewables (only ~20% of electricity, vs ~40% in Germany) and possibly restarting some nuclear plants safely – without compromising energy security. Japanese firms are contributing through green innovation (e.g. Toyota’s hybrid and electric vehicles, Panasonic’s battery technology, Komatsu’s energy-efficient machinery). Culturally, Japan’s post-war ethos of energy conservation (as seen in campaigns like Cool Biz to save air conditioning and the 1970s oil-shock slogan “Oil is Yuyo (precious)”) provides a foundation for public cooperation in sustainability efforts. Still, meeting international expectations will require bolder moves in the coming decade, such as phasing out unabated coal power and achieving greater renewable integration into its energy mix.

12.2 Quality of Life: Health, Work-Life Balance, and Housing

Japan consistently ranks high on many quality-of-life indicators, especially health. It boasts one of the world’s longest life expectancies – about 84 years at birth (88 for women, 81 for men) – which is several years above the OECD average. Japanese society benefits from a universal healthcare system that delivers generally excellent outcomes (e.g. very low infant mortality and a high “healthy life expectancy” of 73+ years) at a moderate cost (health spending is ~11–12% of GDP, comparable to European levels and far below U.S. levels). A combination of factors contributes to Japan’s longevity: diet (high in fish and vegetables), active lifestyles for elders, and effective public health measures. However, an aging population also means a greater burden of chronic diseases and higher healthcare costs. Japan was a pioneer in long-term care insurance (introduced in 2000), which provides support for seniors who need assistance, funded by mandatory contributions from those over 40. Ensuring quality of life for the elderly – through healthcare, social care, and community support – is a central policy concern as nearly 29% of the population is over 65. By comparison, Germany is aging as well (22% over 65) and has a similar long-term care insurance model, whereas the U.S. (17% over 65) and South Korea (18% over 65, but growing fast) have their own challenges with elder care (South Korea introduced long-term care insurance in 2008, and the U.S. relies mostly on family care or costly private options).

Work-life balance is an area where Japan notably underperforms. Long working hours and intense work cultures have historically led to poor outcomes in this dimension. According to the OECD’s Better Life Index, Japan scores only 3.4 out of 10 on work-life balance, placing near the bottom of developed nations. Many Japanese employees work significant overtime (often unpaid), a phenomenon so entrenched that it spawned the term karōshi (“death by overwork”) for fatal cases of overwork-related strokes or heart attacks. On average, about 22% of Japanese employees work 50+ hours per week, well above the OECD average of 10%. This overwork culture has been driven by factors like strong dedication to employers, staff shortages, and social expectations to put work before personal life. The consequences have included stress-related illness, low birth rates (due in part to lack of time for family), and suppressed productivity per hour. Recognizing these issues, the Japanese government and businesses have begun implementing reforms. In 2018, the Work Style Reform legislation came into effect, setting legal caps on overtime (generally 45 hours/month with an absolute limit of 100 hours in special cases) and requiring a minimum 5 days of paid leave to be taken by workers annually. Enforcement has been tightened on companies that violate overtime rules. Additionally, the government launched initiatives like Premium Friday (urging workers to leave early on the last Friday of each month) and is promoting workplace flexibility. During the COVID-19 pandemic, remote work adoption increased, giving many a glimpse of more flexible work arrangements. More recently, there is discussion of a four-day workweek; a few large firms (e.g. Panasonic) have piloted optional four-day weeks, and the government’s 2021 economic policy guidelines encouraged companies to consider shorter workweeks to improve wellbeing and perhaps boost the flagging birthrate. In practice, change has been gradual – cultural attitudes are slowly shifting as younger generations value personal time, but many Japanese employees still hesitate to leave work before their bosses or take all their leave.

Housing conditions in Japan present a contrast between crowded urban centers and depopulating rural areas. In major cities like Tokyo and Osaka, housing is expensive and space is at a premium. Urban Japanese families often live in small apartments by Western standards (the average dwelling floor area per person is smaller than in the U.S. or Europe). Nonetheless, housing quality is generally high: over 93% of dwellings have modern amenities like private indoor flushing toilets (just slightly below the near-universal level in Western countries). Japan’s housing stock is relatively new (houses are often rebuilt rather than passed down for generations), which means modern construction but also a high replacement rate. Real estate prices saw a historic peak in the late 1980s bubble, then a long decline; in recent years Tokyo’s prices have risen again, though nationwide housing affordability is helped by low interest rates and the fact that Japan’s population is shrinking. A major issue is the growing number of vacant homes: as the population ages and declines, especially in rural prefectures, millions of houses and apartments have no occupants. As of 2023, a record 9.0 million homes in Japan were vacant – about 13.8% of all houses. These include abandoned rural homes left behind by elderly residents or their heirs, and empty units in cities. The government has responded with programs to encourage the reuse of vacant homes, such as online “akiya banks” listing abandoned homes at low cost to entice younger families or even foreign buyers to relocate. Some local governments offer subsidies or tax breaks to those who renovate old houses. This phenomenon of urban-rural imbalance is striking: while Tokyo’s population swelled (until a recent slight dip during the pandemic), many villages in the countryside have become “ghost” communities with only a few elderly residents remaining.

Comparative Perspective: Japan’s quality of life metrics reflect a blend of strengths and weaknesses vis-à-vis other countries. In health, Japan and South Korea lead in life expectancy (South Korea’s life expectancy, now about 83 years, is rapidly catching up to Japan’s, thanks to improvements in living standards and healthcare). Germany and other Western European nations cluster around 80–82 years, and the United States significantly lags, with about 77–78 years (due to higher inequality, lifestyle disease prevalence, and a less accessible healthcare system). Japan’s healthcare system provides universal coverage with freedom to choose providers and an emphasis on preventive care; this is similar to Germany’s statutory insurance system and South Korea’s National Health Insurance, whereas the U.S. has a patchwork of private insurance and public programs leading to gaps in coverage. Regarding work-life balance, Western European countries like Germany and France generally outperform – Germans, for example, have shorter average work weeks (a 35-40 hour workweek is common by contract) and much more vacation time by law (at least 20 paid days, often more through collective agreements). The U.S. and South Korea, on the other hand, share some of Japan’s challenges: Americans work longer hours than Europeans and have no federal paid leave minimums (many take fewer vacations, contributing to moderate work-life scores), while South Korea historically had even longer working hours than Japan until recent reforms. In fact, South Korea has also struggled with gwarosa (death by overwork) cases, and its government has reduced the legal maximum workweek from 68 hours to 52 hours in 2018. Culturally, both Japan and Korea value hard work and loyalty to the company, though younger workers in both countries are increasingly pushing back and prioritizing personal time. In terms of housing, Japan’s urban density is comparable to South Korea’s situation in Seoul – both face high city housing costs and limited space, whereas the U.S. has more land and larger homes but also significant housing inequality (including homelessness issues largely absent in Japan). Germany’s housing is generally spacious and of high quality, though German cities also contend with affordability issues in recent years. Notably, Japan has achieved a low homelessness rate and virtually no slums, thanks in part to government safety nets and the cultural stigma around homelessness; by contrast, the U.S. has a visible homelessness crisis in many cities, reflecting differences in social support systems. Each country’s quality of life outcomes thus reflects different balances of economic development, social policy, and cultural norms – and Japan’s experience offers a unique case of world-class health achievement tempered by work-culture strains and demographic headwinds.

12.3 Evolution of Civil Society and Civic Engagement

Japan’s civil society has undergone a significant transformation from the postwar era to today. For much of the 20th century, civic engagement in Japan was constrained by a strong state and a corporatist social structure. During the high-growth decades (1950s–1980s), social order was often maintained through informal networks in companies and communities, and independent non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or advocacy groups were few. Forming a non-profit organization required navigating cumbersome bureaucracy and obtaining government approval, which discouraged grassroots organization. The turning point came in the 1990s. A critical moment was the Great Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe) Earthquake in 1995, a disaster that killed over 6,000 people but also mobilized an unprecedented volunteer response. In the year following the quake, over 1.3 million people volunteered in relief efforts in Kobe and the surrounding region. This spontaneous wave of citizen action is often referred to in Japan as “Volunteer Year One,” symbolizing the birth of a new volunteerism era. In recognition, the government designated 1995 as the “Year of the Volunteer” and began to acknowledge the role of civil society in areas traditionally dominated by the state.

The momentum from 1995 led to the enactment of the NPO Law in 1998 (Act on Promotion of Specified Nonprofit Activities). This law made it far easier for civil groups to register as legal entities (Specified Nonprofit Corporations), enabling them to open bank accounts, rent offices, hire staff, and raise funds legitimately. The impact was dramatic – whereas before 1998 only a limited number of public interest corporations existed (mostly foundations closely linked to government or business), the late 1990s and 2000s saw an explosion of independent civic organizations. By June 2018, Japan had 51,774 registered NPOs, a civil society presence that simply did not exist a generation prior. These nonprofits span a wide range of activities: social services for the elderly, child welfare, environmental conservation groups, community development NPOs, disability advocacy, and more. Many are small and locally focused, but some larger NGOs have gained prominence (for example, humanitarian aid NGOs, or the environmental NGO WWF Japan). Importantly, the NPO sector has also been bolstered by events in the 2010s such as the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami – another crisis that triggered nationwide volunteer mobilization and the creation of new groups to aid in disaster recovery and support affected communities.

Civic engagement in Japan today extends beyond formal NPOs. Traditional neighborhood associations (chōnaikai or jichikai) remain active in many locales – these are local resident groups that organize festivals, clean-ups, crime patrols, and serve as a liaison with municipal authorities. While membership in such associations has declined in big cities (some younger urban residents opt not to participate), they are still vital in smaller communities and suburbs for fostering social ties. Likewise, Japan has a rich array of hobby clubs, cooperatives (e.g. consumer co-ops), and PTAs, which contribute to social capital. Voter turnout and political engagement, however, have been lukewarm: voter turnout in national elections hovers around 50–60% (lower among youth), indicating a level of apathy or disconnect, although issue-based movements occasionally energize the public.

An interesting facet of Japan’s civil society evolution is the growing acceptance of advocacy and protest. In the 1960s, Japan saw large student and labor protests (e.g. the 1960 Anpo protests against the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty), but public demonstrations waned during the economically prosperous 1970s–1980s. Recently, there has been a modest resurgence of activism – for instance, the 2012–2013 anti-nuclear protests following Fukushima, which brought tens of thousands into the streets calling for an end to nuclear power. Youth-led movements have also emerged, such as SEALDs (Students Emergency Action for Liberal Democracy) in 2015, which campaigned against expanded military legislation, introducing a new style of youthful, social-media-savvy protest in Japan. While these movements are smaller than those in some democracies, they mark a shift in a country often seen as consensus-oriented and conflict-averse. Japanese civil society is also increasingly networked globally: NGOs collaborate on issues from climate change to human rights, and foundations (like the Nippon Foundation) fund international projects.

Despite the growth of civil society, challenges persist. Many Japanese NPOs operate on shoestring budgets and rely on volunteer labor. Funding is a critical issue – over 60% of Japanese NPOs receive some government grants, much higher than in other Asian countries, indicating a dependence on state funding. Corporate philanthropy in Japan is still modest (Japanese companies donate far less as a percentage of profits than American firms, for example), though some corporations have CSR programs supporting NPOs or employee volunteering. Culturally, individual charitable giving is not as widespread in Japan as in the U.S.; tax incentives for donations exist (especially for certified public-interest NPOs), but public awareness of them is low. There is also an ongoing effort to strengthen the governance and professionalism of NPOs so they can have greater impact and gain public trust. The government has acknowledged the role of civil society in tackling social problems – even creating frameworks like the “New Public Commons” initiative around 2010 to encourage citizens and NPOs to engage in public problem-solving alongside government.

Comparative Perspective: In an international context, Japan’s civil society engagement has historically been lower than in some Western democracies but has been catching up. The United States has a very vibrant civil society with hundreds of thousands of nonprofits, strong traditions of volunteerism and philanthropy (Americans donated 2.1% of GDP to charity in 2022, whereas Japan’s rate is much lower), and higher volunteer participation – about 25% of Americans formally volunteer each year, compared to roughly 15% in Japan (according to national surveys). U.S. civil society benefits from a culture that encourages community involvement and tax deductions that incentivize giving, though it too has seen declines in some forms of participation (as noted by Robert Putnam’s Bowling Alone, which highlighted a drop in club memberships and trust). Germany also has a rich civic landscape: longstanding associations (Vereine) for everything from sports to singing to firefighting, and major welfare NGOs (like Caritas, Red Cross, Diakonie) that partner with the state to deliver services. Germans have moderately high volunteer rates and a strong culture of local clubs and social membership, which has sustained social capital. South Korea’s civil society in the authoritarian era was repressed, but since democratization in 1987 it has flourished especially in advocacy and social movements – Korean citizens famously organized the Candlelight Protests of 2016–2017, peaceful mass demonstrations of millions that led to the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye. This showcased a high level of civic mobilization and public demand for accountability. South Korea also has a large network of NGOs, including very active labor unions and citizens’ groups that push for reforms (though like Japan, many rely on government or corporate funding). Each country’s context differs: the U.S. trusts non-profits to innovate in areas where government is limited; Germany’s model institutionalizes NGOs as part of the social system; South Korea’s civil movements are a counterweight to business-political elites. Japan’s case is unique in how rapidly its civil society had to mature in the last 25 years – from a relative vacuum to a growing ecosystem of NPOs – and how it remains in a balancing act with a bureaucratic state and corporate sector that have traditionally dominated problem-solving. Notably, the Japanese government has begun actively leveraging civil society in certain areas, as seen in recent years with the issue of social isolation: during the COVID-19 pandemic, the government allocated ¥6 billion in emergency funds to support NPOs providing counseling and community support for people facing loneliness. Such collaboration suggests a gradually changing mindset that societal challenges require not just government or business, but also citizen-led solutions.

12.4 Structural Social Challenges: Inequality, Loneliness, and Community

While Japan is a prosperous and generally cohesive society, it faces several structural social challenges that have become more pronounced since the 1990s. These include rising economic inequality, social isolation and loneliness (especially among certain demographics), and the weakening of traditional community bonds amid urbanization and demographic change. These issues are interrelated and have prompted a variety of policy responses and initiatives.

Inequality and Economic Security: Postwar Japan was often characterized as an egalitarian society with a large middle class – the notion of “ichioku sōchūryū” (“100 million all middle-class”) was a point of national pride. Income distribution was relatively equal in the 1970s and 1980s, bolstered by lifetime employment practices, a smaller gap between executive and worker pay, and redistributive policies. However, since the economic stagnation after the burst of the bubble in 1991, inequality has crept upward. Japan’s Gini coefficient (after taxes and transfers) has risen from around 0.30 in the mid-1980s to roughly 0.38 in recent years. This level is now on par with the OECD average, meaning Japan is less uniquely equal than it once was. Notably, Japan’s relative poverty rate (the share of people living on less than half the median income) is about 15–16%, which is higher than many European countries (e.g. Germany ~10%) and second only to the United States among G7 nations. Poverty is concentrated among specific groups: single-parent households (especially single mothers) and elderly people living alone have very high poverty rates. Japan’s single-mother poverty rate is near the worst among OECD countries, reflecting limited child support and the fact that many single mothers work low-wage non-regular jobs. Elderly poverty is another serious concern – the senior citizen poverty rate is among the highest in the OECD. In the most recent survey (2020 data), Japan’s pre-tax income Gini for the elderly jumped to 0.570 (indicating substantial inequality of market incomes as more seniors have little or no earnings), but the tax and transfer system – mainly public pensions – reduced the post-redistribution Gini to 0.381. In other words, public pensions and social support significantly alleviate old-age inequality, but still roughly one in five Japanese seniors lives in relative poverty (defined by income), a situation exacerbated by the increasing number of seniors living alone without family support.

Why has inequality risen in Japan? A major factor is the changing labor market. Since the 1990s, there has been a marked increase in non-regular employment (contract, part-time, dispatched workers) who earn less and have less job security than regular employees. Today, about 37% of Japan’s workforce is non-regular, and these positions often come with limited benefits and scant career advancement. Young people entering the job market during the “Lost Decades” often could only secure temporary jobs, affecting their lifetime earnings. Women are also overrepresented in non-regular roles (many women work part-time due to childrearing or re-entering the workforce later), contributing to Japan’s sizable gender pay gap – women earn on average ~77% of men’s wages, and women hold few management roles (only 15% of supervisors are female), among the lowest in OECD. Broader economic forces, such as globalization and technological change, have also created winners and losers, while Japan’s traditional redistributive mechanisms (like company-based welfare) have weakened. The government has gradually expanded social welfare (for example, introducing a modest unemployment insurance in the 2000s, raising the state pension for the very old, and more recently increasing childcare support), but its fiscal capacity is constrained by the huge national debt and costs of an aging society. The tax system has become less progressive over time – top income tax rates and corporate taxes were lowered significantly in past decades, and reliance on regressive consumption tax (raised to 10% in 2019) increased, which some argue has put more burden on lower-income households.

Relative poverty rates in Japan and peer countries (latest available data) – shown as the percentage of the population living on less than 50% of median income. Japan’s poverty rate (around 16%) is notably higher than in Germany (~9%) and is similar to South Korea and the United States (both around 17–18%). Japan historically prided itself on equitable growth, but today its poverty level is among the highest in the developed world. This is partly due to limited redistribution and a high incidence of low-wage work. In contrast, Germany’s extensive social safety nets and labor protections keep poverty low, while the U.S. tolerates higher inequality with relatively weak redistributive policies.

Policy responses to inequality in Japan have been cautious but evolving. In the 2010s, then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s economic program (Abenomics) sought to stimulate growth and job creation; it succeeded in achieving record high employment, but many new jobs were in low-paid sectors. The government did raise the minimum wage gradually (now around ¥961/hour on average, roughly $7–8, still lower than Western Europe’s minimums). Recently, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has emphasized a “New Form of Capitalism” that calls for wealth distribution and a stronger middle class – advocating wage hikes and more corporate profit sharing. There have been tax incentives for companies that raise salaries, and in 2023 Japan saw its highest annual wage growth in decades (around 3%) as inflation and labor shortages put pressure on employers. Still, skeptics note that wages in real terms remain lower than in the 1990s, and social assistance for the poor (public assistance, known as seikatsu hogo) remains stigmatized and underutilized. Only about 1.7% of the population receives public assistance, and strict eligibility rules often exclude those who are unemployed but not yet destitute. Going forward, tackling inequality may require more fundamental shifts – for example, labor reforms to narrow the gap between regular and non-regular workers, greater investment in education and retraining, and possibly more aggressive redistribution (higher taxes on wealth or inheritance, which Japan thus far has been hesitant to use beyond a point).

Loneliness and Social Isolation: A less tangible but increasingly salient challenge in Japan is the prevalence of loneliness and social isolation. Economic changes, demographic patterns, and cultural factors have contributed to what some commentators call muen shakai (“relationless society”), where individuals lack meaningful social ties. Several trends underlie this phenomenon. First, Japan’s demographic shift means there are more elderly people living alone. Many older Japanese once lived in multi-generational households, but today over 6 million seniors live by themselves. Some never married or are widowed, and with fewer children (Japan’s fertility rate is only ~1.3), there may be no family nearby. These isolated seniors are at risk of kodokushi, or “lonely death,” a term for people dying alone and unnoticed – a situation that draws considerable public concern. Second, social isolation is not limited to the elderly. Japan has an estimated 1 million hikikomori, typically working-age (or young adult) individuals – often men – who withdraw from society, sometimes confining themselves at home for months or years. This extreme form of social withdrawal has complex causes (academic or work pressure, mental health issues, social anxiety, etc.), and the government has recently extended support programs to middle-aged and older hikikomori as well, since some early hermits are now in their 40s and 50s. Third, work-centered lifestyles and urban anonymity have left many adults with shrinking social circles. People in Japan report fewer close friends compared to two decades ago, and community bonds have loosened (as evidenced by declining participation in local events or clubs in urban areas).

Recognizing the detrimental effects of loneliness – which include mental health issues (Japan’s suicide rate, while improved from its peak in the early 2000s, remains higher than many OECD countries) and even physical health decline – Japan has taken unique policy steps. In 2021, the government appointed a Minister in charge of Loneliness and Isolation to coordinate efforts to combat social isolation. This role was modeled on the U.K.’s Minister of Loneliness. The government also launched a nationwide survey to grasp the extent of loneliness and solicited proposals from experts and NPOs on how to address it. One outcome was the passage of a new law in April 2024 to “prevent loneliness and isolation, problems that affect an estimated 39% of the population”. This law declares loneliness a society-wide issue and calls on local governments to establish regional networks of support groups for isolated individuals. It also provides for training of community support coordinators and creating databases of effective local initiatives. Essentially, Japan is building an infrastructure to reconnect people – for instance, through local salons for seniors living alone, community cafés, telephone helplines, and outreach programs. The COVID-19 pandemic, which necessitated social distancing, ironically brought the issue to the forefront as people realized the importance of social connection for well-being. During the pandemic, the rise in suicides among young women in 2020 (attributed partly to isolation and economic stress) and tragedies like people dying alone in their apartments heightened the sense of urgency.

Civil society and businesses are also playing roles in alleviating loneliness. Many NPOs focus on creating “spaces of belonging” – for example, nonprofit community centers where locals can drop in for tea and chat, or organizations like Ibasho that set up community cafés run by elders and youth together to foster intergenerational support. Tech solutions have emerged too: social robots (like the cute seal robot Paro or SoftBank’s Pepper) have been used in some nursing homes to provide companionship, and various apps attempt to connect people with shared interests. Companies have started to emphasize employee wellness and work-life harmony as part of their CSR, recognizing that burnt-out or isolated workers are less productive. Some firms encourage employees to volunteer in the community on company time, both to contribute to society and to build employees’ social networks beyond work.

Community and Urban-Rural Divide: Traditional community ties in Japan have frayed under the forces of modernization, urbanization, and demographic change. In past generations, the typical Japanese person’s identity and support network were anchored in a tight-knit community – be it the rural village (mura), the urban neighborhood, the extended family, or the company one worked for (which often provided social activities and a sense of “family”). Today, these communal structures are under strain. Rural areas have seen perhaps the most dramatic change: as young people migrated to cities for education and jobs over the last few decades, many villages and small towns have experienced depopulation and aging. Schools have closed, businesses shuttered, and remaining residents can feel cut off. Urbanization in Japan is now around 92% (the share of people living in urban areas), up from about 76% in 1970, reflecting a steady migration city-ward.

Japan’s urban-rural demographics have shifted significantly. This chart shows the percentage of population living in urban areas over time for Japan, Germany, South Korea, and the United States. Japan (blue line) urbanized rapidly in the postwar period and today about 92% of its people are urban dwellers. South Korea (green line) has an even steeper curve, going from ~35% urban in 1960 to over 81% by 2020 as it industrialized. Germany (orange line) and the U.S. (red line) were already highly urbanized by 1960 (~70-75%) and have grown more slowly to about 77–84%. Japan’s high urbanization, combined with population decline, means rural communities face shrinking populations and the loss of younger generations to cities.

The weakening of community ties is not only a rural issue. In megacities like Tokyo, while crime is low and society orderly, people often do not know their neighbors well, and apartment life can be isolating. There has been a decline in membership in neighborhood associations and PTAs in cities as dual-income families have less time for such activities. The sense of a supportive community is harder to maintain in high-rise apartment blocks than in the old shōtengai (shopping street) neighborhoods or company dormitories of the past. Additionally, the erosion of the “corporate community” is a factor: Japanese companies in the high-growth era often functioned as a social unit (employees did group calisthenics, drank together after hours, went on company trips). With more fluid employment and diversified values, the workplace is less of a surrogate family than before, which is not necessarily negative but does remove a source of belonging for some.

To counter these trends, various initiatives aim to rebuild community connections. One approach is “community-based integrated care” for the elderly – Japan is creating local networks that link healthcare, nursing care, volunteer groups, and local authorities so that seniors can continue to live in their home area with support. Another approach is the government’s Regional Revitalization policies, which offer incentives for urbanites to move to rural areas (for example, financial support for people who relocate to countryside to start businesses or work remotely). Some young Japanese are drawn to rural living for a slower lifestyle, and programs like the IJU Turn (encouraging migration into rural areas or return to hometowns) have had modest success. There are also efforts to repurpose vacant houses (akiya) as community assets – turning an old empty home into a local library or community center, for instance. On the technology front, improving digital infrastructure in rural regions (like high-speed internet) is seen as a way to keep those areas viable, allowing people to telework and access services without moving to the city.

An important element of social cohesion is trust – trust in others and trust in institutions. Japan’s social trust levels are moderate: surveys (like the World Values Survey) find roughly 30–40% of Japanese respondents say that “most people can be trusted,” which is lower than in high-trust countries like the Nordic nations (60%+) but higher than in some other societies. Trust in Japan has been challenged by scandals (for example, government missteps or corporate fraud can erode trust), yet communities often pull together during crises. The 2011 earthquake/tsunami disaster saw a tremendous outpouring of mutual aid and volunteerism that temporarily boosted social solidarity nationwide. However, on a day-to-day basis, the combination of higher inequality and social isolation can chip away at interpersonal trust. Research has shown that more unequal societies tend to have lower general trust – people may feel less connected across socioeconomic lines. Japan’s rise in inequality and solitary living arrangements is therefore a concern for social cohesion.

Interpersonal trust in Japan versus other countries – this chart illustrates the share of people who agree that “most people can be trusted.” Japan’s trust level (roughly one-third of people) is lower than Germany’s (~45%) and the United States’ (~39%), but somewhat comparable to South Korea’s (~27%). Cultural and social differences influence these rates. Germany, with its strong social safety net and less income disparity, sustains higher trust, whereas in Japan and South Korea, relatively lower trust may stem from rapid social changes and the emphasis on tight in-group bonds (family, close friends) over wider social trust. Nonetheless, Japan’s moderate trust level implies room for strengthening social capital in communities.

Comparative Perspective: Japan is not alone in facing these social cohesion challenges – many advanced nations are dealing with inequality, loneliness, and community fracture, though the severity and context vary. The United States, for example, has very high inequality (its Gini and poverty rates are among the worst in the OECD) and this has manifested in stark social divides and even political polarization that threaten cohesion. The U.S. also reports rising loneliness – a 2021 Harvard survey found 36% of Americans felt “serious loneliness.” Unlike Japan, the U.S. has significant pockets of poverty and homelessness that strain community fabric; however, the U.S. also has a culture of community volunteering and charity as a counterbalance, and a tradition of local religious or civic groups that can provide support (though, as Putnam noted, some of this has declined). European countries like Germany generally have stronger social safety nets and thus lower poverty and potentially less loneliness among the elderly (due to pension security and more institutional support). Indeed, Germany’s elderly poverty rate is around 10%, whereas South Korea’s is extraordinarily high – around 40–45% of Korean seniors live in relative poverty, reflecting how rapidly family support norms collapsed there and how state support lagged. This has led to severe outcomes in South Korea, including the highest elderly suicide rate in the OECD for many years. South Korea and Japan share very low fertility and a growing number of young people not marrying (in Japan, almost 25% of men and 15% of women by age 50 are unmarried, a rate that has risen sharply). This means more people aging without immediate family, which is a common driver of isolation. Both countries have begun promoting community-based solutions; South Korea, for instance, is expanding senior community centers and encouraging intergenerational living arrangements, and it observed Japan’s creation of a Loneliness Minister with interest.

Loneliness has become such a global concern that the U.K. was the first to appoint a Minister for Loneliness in 2018, and others including Japan followed. Even in the relatively cohesive Germany and Nordic countries, surveys show an appreciable minority (around 6–13%) of people feel socially isolated. The COVID-19 pandemic universally underscored this problem. Governments and businesses around the world are now talking about work-life balance, flexible work, mental health support, and community building as mainstream policy issues, not just private matters. Japan’s approaches – such as formalizing a strategy on loneliness and pushing companies to allow more family time – could offer useful lessons. Conversely, Japan can learn from abroad: for example, community policing and local club activities in Germany keep many elderly engaged; “village movement” models in the U.S. (where seniors form networks to help each other age in place) could be adapted; and South Korea’s experience shows the importance of bolstering public pensions and social services to prevent elderly isolation in rapidly aging societies.

In summary, Japan’s contemporary social challenges of inequality, loneliness, and weakening community are significant, but they are being met with a combination of policy innovation, civil society action, and gradual shifts in business practices. Ensuring social cohesion in the face of economic and demographic pressures is an ongoing process. Japan’s success in this endeavor will depend on sustaining inclusive economic growth (so fewer people are left behind), nurturing the nascent civil society to connect people and fill gaps, and revitalizing communities so that they continue to provide identity and support in an era of change. These efforts resonate far beyond Japan – other countries, too, are watching and learning as they grapple with the common challenges of sustainability and social cohesion in the modern world.

References

Bertelsmann Stiftung. (2024). SGI 2024 – Japan Report: Social Sustainability. Gütersloh: Sustainable Governance Indicators.

Kantei (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet). (2021, September 27). Preparatory Meeting of the Collaborative Platform for Loneliness and Isolation Measures. [Press Release]

Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (Japan). (2024). Housing and Land Survey. [Data release]

OECD. (2025). OECD Environmental Performance Reviews: Japan 2025. Paris: OECD Publishing.

OECD. (2024). Society at a Glance 2024: OECD Social Indicators. Paris: OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/918d8db3‑en

The Asahi Shimbun. (2024, April 2). Law enacted to battle growing problem of loneliness.

The Asahi Shimbun. (2023, August 23). Japan records its second-worst income disparity as society ages.

World Bank. (2023). World Development Indicators (database). Washington, DC.

World Values Survey. (2022). Wave 7 (2017–2021) Results. Vienna: WVSA.

Yamaguchi, K. (2018). “Revenue an Issue for Many Organizations as NPO Law Reaches Twentieth Year.” Nippon.com, September 13, 2018.