14 Urban Futures, Governance, and Emerging Social Challenges in Japan
Japan is undergoing profound socio-economic shifts shaped by rapid urbanization, demographic aging, and digital transformation. These changes are redefining how people live and work, exacerbating regional disparities, and challenging traditional governance and community structures. Urban centers – especially the Tokyo metropolitan area – continue to attract economic activity and population, even as many rural towns shrink and age. At the same time, civic engagement patterns and local governance models are evolving under the pressures of an older electorate and technological change. The nature of work is also in flux: long-standing norms like lifetime employment are giving way to more fluid and mobile labor arrangements, driven by economic restructuring and the rise of digital economies. This chapter provides an analytical overview of these key trends in Japan, focusing on urban futures, governance, and emerging social challenges. It examines how digital transformation, aging demographics, and economic shifts are influencing urban planning policies, the decline of depopulated rural areas, and citizen engagement. Throughout, comparisons are drawn with Germany, South Korea, and the United States to contextualize Japan’s experience in a global perspective. The goal is to offer a graduate-level analysis of how Japanese society is adapting to these complex challenges, and what lessons can be learned from its approaches in public policy, urban studies, and socio-economic development.
14.1 Urbanization and Regional Inequality in Japan
Japan is one of the most urbanized countries in the world. As of 2023, about 92% of Japan’s population lives in urban areas, a proportion significantly higher than in many other advanced economies. (By comparison, about 78% of Germany’s population is urban, 81.5% in South Korea, and 83% in the United States.) This high urban concentration reflects decades of migration from rural regions to cities, and especially to the sprawling Tokyo metropolitan region. Tokyo-Yokohama is by far Japan’s largest urban agglomeration and an economic powerhouse that has drawn in young workers from across the nation. The intense urbanization has, however, gone hand-in-hand with growing regional inequality between thriving metropolitan centers and struggling peripheral regions.
Figure 1: Urban population (% of total) in 2023 for Japan and peer countries. Japan’s population is overwhelmingly urban, far more so than Germany, South Korea, or the United States. This reflects Japan’s heavy concentration of people and economic activity in cities. High urbanization has contributed to imbalances, as rural areas lose population to megacities.
Rural Japan faces a vicious cycle of depopulation and economic decline. Many countryside prefectures have seen continuous population losses and rapidly aging communities as younger residents depart for opportunities in Tokyo, Osaka, and other major cities. In contrast to the dense “megacity” life of urban Japan, some rural villages are literally dying out. A striking example is Nanmoku in Gunma Prefecture – often cited as the oldest community in Japan – where 67% of the population is now aged over 65. Nanmoku and similar villages are confronting the prospect of extinction; experts warn that hundreds of municipalities could disappear by 2040 if current trends persist. Indeed, one study by the Japan Policy Council identified 869 municipalities at risk of vanishing by around 2040 due to fertility decline and youth out-migration. Such depopulation leaves behind ghost towns dotted with vacant homes – an estimated 9 million empty houses (akiya) nationwide – and erodes local economies and services. Rural localities struggle to maintain schools, hospitals, and businesses with ever-fewer and older residents. Infrastructure in these areas (roads, rail lines, community centers) often falls into disuse or disrepair as population dwindles. This stark urban–rural divide in Japan has widened since the late 20th century, even though overall income inequality between regions is somewhat lower than the OECD average. In 2020, for example, the gap in per capita GDP between Japan’s large metropolitan regions and non-metropolitan regions was 1.13-fold (metro areas slightly more prosperous), which is a smaller gap than the OECD average of 1.47. Nonetheless, disparities in opportunity and living conditions are keenly felt: rural areas face higher poverty rates, fewer job options, and limited access to services, contributing to a sense of marginalization.
Several policy initiatives aim to address these regional imbalances. The Japanese government has long employed regional development policies and subsidies to stimulate local economies, but in recent years has shifted toward leveraging digital technology as a revitalization tool. The Kishida administration’s flagship program, the “Vision for a Digital Garden City Nation,” explicitly seeks to harness digital transformation to solve rural problems and improve regional attractiveness. By expanding high-speed broadband, promoting remote work, and supporting tech startups in rural zones, policymakers hope to enable people to “live conveniently and comfortably wherever they live in Japan”. This vision includes developing smart villages, telemedicine for areas with few doctors, online education for remote communities, and other ICT-based services to enhance rural quality of life. However, significant hurdles remain, as many depopulated villages still lack robust internet infrastructure and digital skills – indeed, some genkai shūraku (“marginal villages”) have no broadband at all. Improving digital connectivity is necessary but not sufficient; economic opportunities must follow to truly entice younger generations to stay or return to the countryside.
Another approach has been encouraging reverse migration out of Tokyo. In a notable recent policy, Japan’s central government began offering sizable financial incentives for families to relocate from the Tokyo region to provincial areas. Starting in 2023, families who move out of greater Tokyo can receive ¥1 million per child (about $7,500) as a relocation grant – a dramatic increase from the previous ¥300,000 per child incentive. This program, aimed at “breathing life into declining towns and villages,” reflects concern that the Tokyo dominance has become too extreme. Tokyo’s population actually fell for the first time in 2021 (partly a temporary result of COVID-19 disruptions), and officials hope to reinforce this nascent trend by nudging people to consider regional living. It remains to be seen whether such incentives will significantly redistribute population, as moving involves finding jobs and adjusting to rural life, not just a one-time payment. Nonetheless, some success stories exist where urban émigrés have rejuvenated villages by starting businesses (for instance, young entrepreneurs opening bakeries or inns in Nanmoku). Local governments are also proactively marketing their towns’ charms – affordable housing, closer-knit communities, and proximity to nature – to draw in remote workers and young families priced out of Tokyo.
Urban planning strategies are being rethought in light of these demographic shifts. Cities in Japan increasingly pursue “compact city” models to manage the needs of an aging, shrinking population. Rather than sprawling outward, some cities concentrate development in denser hubs where public transport, healthcare, and retail can be maintained efficiently. Toyama City is a leading example: faced with a rapidly aging populace, Toyama implemented a compact city plan to relocate residents into well-serviced urban cores along transit lines. This has improved older residents’ access to amenities and enhanced their independence by ensuring walkable neighborhoods and accessible transit. Such age-friendly urban design is increasingly crucial – not only in Japan but also in places like Germany – to allow seniors to remain active in city life. German cities, for instance, are retrofitting infrastructure (elevators in U-Bahn stations, curb-free streets) to accommodate an older citizenry, much as Japan is doing. Moreover, Japanese urban policy has begun emphasizing “urban renaissance” in city centers (through the Urban Renaissance Special Measures Law of 2014) to redevelop aging downtowns and make them attractive for both businesses and residents. In sum, Japan’s urban future involves a dual challenge: sustaining the dynamism of its major cities while preventing the collapse of its rural peripheries. The balancing act involves large-scale policy (fiscal transfers, national digital initiatives) and local innovation (smart city projects, compact urban design), all under the shadow of unprecedented demographic headwinds.
Comparatively, South Korea faces a very similar urban-rural divide. Seoul and its surrounding area dominate the national economy, while provincial towns struggle with out-migration. South Korea’s urbanization is also high (over 80%) and its rural communities are aging even faster than Japan’s – Korea recently joined Japan as a “super-aged” society, with 20% of its population now over 65. The South Korean government is likewise pursuing digital rural revitalization and relocation incentives to reduce the Seoul-centric concentration. Germany, on the other hand, has a more dispersed urban system – multiple mid-sized cities (Munich, Hamburg, Frankfurt, etc.) and strong regional hubs help alleviate a single primate city dynamic. Germany’s urban population share (78%) is lower than Japan’s, and deliberate policies after reunification directed investment to smaller cities in the eastern states to even out development. Nonetheless, rural eastern Germany and some depopulating towns (especially in the former GDR) echo the Japanese experience of shrinkage, if less severely. Meanwhile, the United States exhibits a different pattern: while ~83% urban, the U.S. has significant suburbanization and exurban development. American population movement is more fluid, with Sun Belt cities growing and some Rust Belt and rural areas losing people. The U.S. mitigates rural decline partly through domestic migration and immigration, whereas Japan’s internal migration has mainly funneled into a single metropolitan mega-region. Thus, Japan’s regional inequality is characterized by a Tokyo-vs-the-rest paradigm, demanding targeted solutions as described above.
14.2 Changes in Civic Participation and Local Governance
Japan’s political and civic landscape is being reshaped by both demographic forces and reforms to government structure. One notable trend is the decline in civic participation through traditional channels such as voting. Voter turnout in Japan has fallen in recent decades and remains relatively low for an advanced democracy. In the most recent national elections, turnout was only about 53% of registered voters – well below the OECD average of ~69%. This indicates a degree of apathy or disengagement, especially among younger citizens. Indeed, youth participation is particularly weak; many Japanese in their 20s cite disillusionment with politics and a feeling that their vote carries little weight. (By contrast, countries like Germany typically see 70-80% turnout in federal elections, and South Korea often above 75%, reflecting different civic cultures.) The low participation is not limited to voting: other forms of civic engagement – public consultations, local referenda, volunteering in community organizations – have historically been limited in Japan. The OECD ranks Japan below its peers in stakeholder engagement in governance; for example, Japan scores only 1.4 out of 4 on an index of public engagement in regulatory decision-making, versus an OECD average of 2.1. In short, the avenues for citizens to influence policy have been under-utilized, contributing to a gap between government and the public.
However, signs of change are emerging. One driver is the generational shift: as younger cohorts (more adept with digital communication) come of age, new forms of civic activism are taking shape online. Social media campaigns, e-petitions, and issue-based movements (on topics like climate change or gender equality) are gaining some traction among Japanese youth, partly circumventing the traditional formality of politics. Another catalyst was the 2011 triple disaster (earthquake, tsunami, Fukushima nuclear accident), which spurred unprecedented civil society mobilization in volunteer and NPO activities. The number of non-profit organizations and local volunteer groups grew after 2011, reflecting a rise in civic volunteerism to support disaster relief and community rebuilding. This trend continued with COVID-19, as citizen groups formed to help vulnerable neighbors and advocate for public health measures. While Japan’s civil society was once described as relatively “weak” or state-aligned, it has been gradually strengthening in response to social challenges. Notably, the government’s NPO Law (enacted in 1998) made it easier to establish non-profit civic organizations, and thousands of new NPOs have since been registered, providing channels for citizen participation outside of elections.
Local governance in Japan has also undergone significant restructuring. During the 2000s, the central government pushed through the Great Heisei Municipal Amalgamations (Heisei no daigappei) to consolidate municipal governments. Over 1999–2010, the number of municipalities was cut from 3,232 to 1,727, as many small towns and villages were merged into larger administrative units. This dramatic consolidation aimed to improve efficiency and fiscal sustainability in the face of shrinking local populations and strained local budgets. While the mergers did create economies of scale (bigger municipalities can pool resources and have larger tax bases), they also sometimes alienated residents who feared the loss of local identity and representation. A town that merges into a city, for example, may lose its local mayor and council, folding into a broader city government. Despite these concerns, the Heisei amalgamations were largely successful in reducing the number of tiny, financially unsustainable village governments. As of 2021, Japan has roughly 1,718 municipalities, each now responsible for larger geographic areas and populations than before. This has implications for governance: local offices are farther from some residents, but larger governments may provide more professional services.
Additionally, Japan undertook a Decentralization Reform in the late 1990s and 2000s, devolving more authority from central ministries to prefectures and municipalities. The 2000 Omnibus Decentralization Law transferred many administrative functions to local governments and abolished the system where prefectural governors were double-hatted as agents of the central state. Local governments now have more formal autonomy in areas like social services, education, and local economic policy. With greater autonomy comes greater responsibility – yet many municipalities struggle with limited finances, especially those in aging, low-growth regions. There is an inherent tension in Japan’s local governance: the central government expects localities to be engines of innovation and self-help (jichi, or local self-governance is a long-valued concept), but in practice many depend on central subsidies to make ends meet. Poor, aging towns have shrinking tax revenues and rising welfare costs (elderly care, medical), often requiring intergovernmental fiscal transfers to stay afloat.
Aging demographics are profoundly affecting governance at the local level. The electorate in rural areas is disproportionately elderly, leading to what some commentators dub “gray politics.” Older voters tend to have higher turnout rates than youth, giving them significant influence on local policy priorities. Not surprisingly, many local governments prioritize healthcare facilities, senior centers, and pensioner needs. In extreme cases like the aforementioned Nanmoku (with two-thirds of voters above 65), local assemblies consist largely of senior citizens focusing on managing population decline rather than long-term development. The dominance of elderly constituents can crowd out issues important to younger families (such as education or child care) from the agenda. This is a challenge Germany is also grappling with as its population ages, though Germany’s steady intake of younger immigrants somewhat offsets the gray shift. South Korea likewise has rapidly aging electorates in provincial areas, raising similar governance questions about intergenerational balance in policy.
Digital transformation offers both opportunities and tests for civic engagement and local governance in Japan. The country has historically lagged behind in e-government and administrative IT modernization – a fact thrown into relief during the COVID-19 pandemic when many procedures (like submitting relief applications or health data) were still paper-based or fax-based. Observers noted a delay in government digitalization efforts in Japan, especially relative to South Korea or the U.S., and this became a critical issue during COVID-19. In response, Japan established a new Digital Agency in 2021 to accelerate the digitization of public services and bureaucratic processes. The aim is to improve efficiency and make government more user-friendly, for example by moving resident registrations, tax filings, and benefit applications online. For local governments, digital tools can enable better citizen engagement – such as online town hall meetings, e-petition platforms, or smartphone apps for city services and incident reporting. A few pioneering localities have experimented with such tools: e.g. some city halls use social media to gather citizen feedback or have open data portals to involve civic tech enthusiasts in solving community problems. Nevertheless, implementing digital governance is difficult in aging areas where many residents (and officials) are not tech-savvy. Japan’s seniors have relatively low digital literacy, and some fear that moving services online could disenfranchise those who cannot easily use computers or smartphones. The government’s challenge is to go digital without leaving anyone behind – a point often discussed in policy circles. For instance, municipalities have set up “digital support desks” to teach older people how to use e-government services, and there is even a push to recruit retired tech professionals as local IT volunteers to assist their peers.
In comparison, Germany and the United States present interesting contrasts. Germany has a strong tradition of local governance with substantial citizen input at the municipal level (town hall meetings, local referenda are common). Voter turnout in local elections there is higher than in Japan, and civic associations (Schützenvereine, volunteer fire brigades, etc.) play a vibrant role in community life. However, Germany’s bureaucracy is also sometimes accused of being slow to digitize; much paperwork is still done with physical forms and the fax machine remains strangely prevalent – a parallel to Japan’s experience. The U.S., with its federal system, shows high variability: some American cities are on the cutting edge of digital civic tech and open government (for example, participatory budgeting in New York or Boston’s city mobile apps), whereas other rural counties struggle with basic broadband access. U.S. civic participation tends to manifest through NGOs, activism, and direct contact with local representatives (city councils, school boards), reflecting a political culture of local involvement. Japan’s challenge is to cultivate a similar norm of participation and trust in local governance, overcoming historical centralization and a public that has often been described as politically disengaged.
14.3 Transformations in the Nature of Work and Labor Mobility
The world of work in Japan has been transformed in recent decades by economic stagnation, globalization, and technological change. For much of the postwar 20th century, Japan’s labor market was defined by the paradigm of “lifetime employment” – workers (primarily men in large companies) would join a firm after school or university and remain there until retirement, with the company providing steady seniority-based pay and job security. This system engendered strong company loyalty and internal labor mobility (rotating within the firm), but very low mobility between companies. Even today, average job tenure in Japan is about 10 years for full-time employees, more than double the average tenure in the U.S.. Japanese workers traditionally changed jobs far less frequently than their American counterparts, and mid-career hiring was relatively rare. While Germany also had longer tenures than the U.S., Japanese retention was exceptional. This is now gradually changing. Economic restructuring since the 1990s “Lost Decade” has eroded the lifetime employment norm. Under cost pressures and seeking flexibility, companies increasingly hire non-regular workers (contract, part-time, or temporary staff) instead of permanent employees. These non-regular positions lack the security and benefits of the old system and are often lower paid. As of the early 2020s, roughly 37–40% of Japan’s workforce is in non-regular employment (a figure that has risen from around 20% in the 1990s). Notably, a majority of working women are in part-time or contract roles, and even among men the share of non-regular employment has grown, especially for younger and older workers. This shift mirrors global trends toward more precarious or flexible work, though Japan started from a more rigid baseline.
With the decline of guaranteed lifetime jobs, labor mobility has increased, albeit from a low level. Younger Japanese today are more willing to change employers for better opportunities or work-life balance than previous generations. Mid-career job switching, while still less common than in the U.S., is no longer taboo and is even encouraged in growth sectors like tech. The government has promoted labor mobility as part of economic revitalization – for instance, through programs to help mid-career workers re-skill and by loosening rules on temporary staffing services. The rigidity of Japan’s labor market has been a concern for economic policymakers, as it can impede productivity and innovation when people stay too long in one track. In response, recent years have seen modest reforms to encourage more fluid movement: abolishing the “second new graduate” stigma (allowing people who didn’t join a company straight out of university a fair shot later), and enabling secondments and external assignments to give workers broader experience. Culturally, there is still adjustment happening – many firms remain hesitant to hire mid-career outsiders into senior roles, preferring to promote loyal internal staff. Yet as the labor shortage bites (given the shrinking working-age population), employers have started to value mid-career talent and even foreign hires more than before.
Another major development in the nature of work is the rise of elderly and female workforce participation. Facing a labor crunch from its aging population, Japan has made efforts to tap underutilized segments of the labor force. Female labor participation has climbed steadily since the 2000s, reaching record highs as social norms shift and economic necessity drives more women to work (a trend encouraged by former PM Abe’s “Womenomics” policies). Still, many women are in non-regular jobs or leave the workforce after childbirth, reflecting that full gender parity in careers is not yet achieved. Meanwhile, Japan has one of the highest employment rates for seniors in the world. Over 25% of Japanese aged 65+ work in some capacity, often in part-time or less demanding roles, which is significantly higher than in Western countries (for example, only ~18% of American seniors and ~10% of British seniors work). This “silver workforce” has become vital in sectors like retail, agriculture, and services to compensate for youth shortages. In 2022, the government even raised the optional retirement age and is incentivizing companies to let employees continue working into their late 60s and 70s. Many seniors want to keep working – surveys show about 80% of Japanese workers wish to remain employed after retirement age, citing reasons from financial need to personal fulfillment. However, older workers often face pay cuts or limited opportunities, leading to some dissatisfaction. Ensuring meaningful, productive employment for Japan’s healthy seniors is a key challenge going forward, one that other aging societies like Germany are also beginning to address (Germany too has policies to encourage later retirement and part-time “bridge” jobs for seniors).
Digital transformation is another force reshaping work. Although Japan was somewhat slow to embrace some aspects of the digital economy (such as telecommuting) before 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic triggered a rapid shift. Remote work went from niche to mainstream almost overnight in 2020 as companies followed government calls to reduce commuting. The share of businesses adopting telework jumped from just 20% in 2019 to nearly half of all firms by mid-2020. By 2021, around 21% of Japanese employees were working remotely at least some of the time. However, this trend has partly reversed as the pandemic subsided. A 2023 government survey found only 16.1% of workers teleworked in the past year, down from 21.4% in 2021. Many Japanese companies have been eager to bring staff back to the office, citing better coordination and corporate culture, although a hybrid work pattern is emerging for some. More employees now do 1–2 days per week from home (roughly 13–16% of workers in 2023, higher than during the pandemic) while fewer do full-time remote. This suggests a compromise: a mix of telework and office time, which could become the new norm in Japan’s work culture. By comparison, the U.S. has seen a more sustained shift to remote and hybrid work in many industries, and even traditionally office-centric Germany has expanded teleworking options post-pandemic (though not to the extent of the U.S.). South Korea similarly saw an increase in remote work but also faces pressure to return to in-person norms in its corporate culture. The digitalization of work in Japan also includes the growth of the IT sector, fintech, e-commerce, and other knowledge industries – areas where Japan initially lagged American firms but is investing heavily to catch up. Start-up ecosystems in Tokyo and Osaka are being nurtured to diversify the economy away from heavy manufacturing to more digital services, which will influence job patterns and required skill sets for the future workforce.
Labor mobility in the geographic sense is also evolving. For decades, a hallmark of Japan’s development was the migration of young people from rural prefectures to the big cities for work (as discussed in the urbanization section). That flow largely continues, but there have been subtle shifts. The pandemic momentarily prompted some urban dwellers to relocate to less dense areas (the so-called “Tokyo escape” phenomenon), aided by telework, although many returned when normalcy resumed. More significant is the government’s push for regional labor mobility, encouraging workers to take positions outside the Tokyo region. There are now programs that match urban talent with rural job openings, and subsidies for small firms in regional areas to hire people from metropolitan centers. Nonetheless, challenges persist: high-end professional jobs are still heavily concentrated in Tokyo, and convincing professionals to relocate permanently is difficult. Culturally, young Japanese often prefer the excitement and amenities of big city life. In this respect, Japan differs from, say, Germany where large companies and quality jobs are spread across numerous cities (Munich, Stuttgart, Düsseldorf, etc.), making it more feasible for workers to live outside the capital without sacrificing career prospects. The United States too has multiple economic hubs, allowing more geographic mobility of talent (e.g., tech workers moving from Silicon Valley to Austin or Seattle). Japan’s concentrated geography means labor mobility has a one-way tilt – toward Tokyo – that is hard to reverse, though better broadband and remote work might gradually enable more dispersion.
An increasingly important facet of Japan’s labor strategy is the use of foreign workers. Traditionally an ethnically homogeneous society with strict immigration, Japan for years resisted large-scale foreign labor inflows except through tightly controlled trainee programs. This is changing out of sheer necessity. The foreign workforce in Japan has more than doubled over the past decade. By 2024, Japan had a record 2.3 million foreign workers, a 12.4% increase from the year prior. These workers – originating from China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Nepal, Brazil, and other countries – now fill critical gaps in construction, agriculture, elder care, manufacturing, and services. While they still represent only a few percent of Japan’s total labor force, their presence is increasingly visible and essential in keeping industries running as native-born labor supply declines. The government has gradually expanded visa pathways: introducing new categories in 2019 for “Specified Skilled Workers” to allow longer stays in sectors with acute shortages, and easing some restrictions on blue-collar workers to transition to permanent residency. This marks a notable policy shift, although public sentiment on immigration remains cautious. Comparatively, Germany has actively recruited foreign labor for decades (e.g., the Gastarbeiter program historically, and EU free movement today), and the U.S. relies heavily on both high-skilled immigrants (in tech, academia, medicine) and low-skilled migrant labor (in agriculture, hospitality). Japan is beginning to follow a similar path out of demographic necessity. Projections suggest Japan may need nearly 7 million foreign workers by 2040 to meet economic demands if it wants to maintain growth. Embracing multicultural workplaces and integration will be a social shift for Japan, touching on community dynamics as well.
14.5 Conclusion
Japan stands at the forefront of several profound societal challenges – extreme urban concentration, an aging and shrinking population, changing work patterns, and the need to transform governance and community life accordingly. The urban futures of Japan will likely see its great metropolises continue as engines of innovation and growth, but surrounded by hinterlands that must reinvent themselves or risk collapse. Governance reforms have begun to empower localities and encourage citizen participation, yet there is a long road ahead to invigorate civic engagement to levels seen in some Western democracies. The emerging social challenges of an aging society require adaptive solutions: urban planning must be senior-friendly and inclusive, rural policy must prevent whole regions from “dying”, and labor markets must adjust to fewer youth by engaging women, seniors, and foreigners as never before. Digital transformation offers a ray of hope – as a tool to bridge distances, deliver services efficiently, and perhaps even foster new forms of community – but it must be implemented thoughtfully to avoid widening divides (such as a digital gap for the elderly).
In navigating these issues, Japan provides valuable lessons and points of comparison. Like Germany, Japan must balance economic needs with social equity as it ages, and both are leaning on technology and policy innovation to support older citizens (from smart cities in Toyama to age-friendly housing in Bavaria). Like South Korea, Japan grapples with hyper-urbanization and youth disenchantment, and both show how demographic decline can spur creative policy (Korea’s aggressive smart work centers and Japan’s regional revitalization schemes have parallels). And as in the United States, where the nature of work is rapidly evolving through gig economies and remote work, Japan illustrates the universal challenge of updating labor institutions for the 21st century while maintaining social protection. Ultimately, Japan’s experience underscores that addressing urban-rural divides, retooling governance, and sustaining community in the digital age will require holistic strategies. These include investing in people (education, re-skilling, health), infrastructure (both hard infrastructure like transport and soft infrastructure like broadband and social services), and above all inclusive governance that brings citizens into the decision-making process to rebuild trust and cohesion. Japan’s ongoing experiments – be it a small village broadcasting its council meetings on local TV or the national government partnering with tech firms to bring telemedicine to remote islands – exemplify the adaptive spirit needed. As the world’s first “super-aged” major nation, Japan faces unprecedented pressures, but it also has the opportunity to pioneer solutions for a future that many other countries will soon encounter. In crafting those solutions, careful attention to equity (across regions, generations, and social groups) and sustainability will determine whether Japan can achieve a vibrant, inclusive society amid its urban and demographic transformations. The coming decades will test Japan’s resilience and creativity, and the outcomes will enrich global understanding of how to manage urban futures and social change in an era defined by both the promise and peril of demographic and technological trends.
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