19 The United States of America
The United States of America, often referred to as the U.S. or simply America, is a diverse and influential nation with a rich history and complex geopolitical landscape. From its founding as a colony to its emergence as a global superpower, the U.S. has played a significant role in shaping world events and international relations. This chapter will explore key aspects of U.S. foreign policy, territorial evolution, and the dynamics of isolationism and exceptionalism in American politics.
19.1 Territory
The territorial evolution of the United States since its Declaration of Independence in 1776 reflects a complex interplay of political, social, and economic factors that have shaped its boundaries and governance. This transformation can be categorized into significant land territorial changes, which include acquisitions, cessions, and annexations that have contributed to the expansion of U.S. territory.
One of the earliest territorial changes occurred with the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, where the U.S. acquired approximately 828,000 square miles from France, effectively doubling the size of the nation. This acquisition was driven by the desire for westward expansion and the economic potential of the land, which was seen as vital for agriculture and settlement (Raustiala, 2009). The subsequent Lewis and Clark expedition further emphasized the importance of this territory for exploration and resource utilization (Sparrow, 2017). Following this, the annexation of Texas in 1845 added another significant area, which was fueled by the ideology of Manifest Destiny, a belief that the U.S. was destined to expand across the continent (Sparrow, 2017).
The mid-19th century was marked by the Mexican-American War (1846-1848), resulting in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which ceded vast territories including present-day California, Arizona, New Mexico, and parts of Colorado, Nevada, and Utah to the United States. This war and its outcomes were heavily influenced by the U.S. desire for land and resources, as well as the political dynamics surrounding slavery and statehood (Raustiala, 2009; Sparrow, 2017). The Gadsden Purchase in 1853 further expanded U.S. territory by acquiring land from Mexico to facilitate a southern transcontinental railroad (Raustiala, 2009).
The 19th century also saw the acquisition of Alaska from Russia in 1867, which was initially criticized as “Seward’s Folly” but later recognized for its vast natural resources (Sparrow, 2017). The annexation of Hawaii in 1898 marked another critical territorial change, driven by economic interests, particularly in sugar production, and strategic military considerations in the Pacific (Raustiala, 2009; Sparrow, 2017). In the 20th century, the U.S. continued to expand its territorial reach through various means, including the acquisition of territories following the Spanish-American War in 1898, which resulted in the U.S. gaining control over Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines. This marked a significant shift towards imperialism, as the U.S. began to exert its influence beyond continental borders (Raustiala, 2009; Sparrow, 2017). The subsequent establishment of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in 1952 exemplified the ongoing complexities of U.S. territorial governance and the relationship between the U.S. and its territories (Raustiala, 2009).
The territorial evolution of the United States reflects a complex history of expansion, acquisition, and governance that has shaped the nation’s identity and geopolitical influence. The interplay of political, economic, and social factors has driven territorial changes, with each acquisition reflecting broader strategic interests and historical contexts. The U.S. territorial experience offers valuable insights into the complexities of governance, sovereignty, and territoriality in the context of global geopolitics.
19.2 Isolationism or exceptionalism?
The isolationist doctrine in U.S. foreign policy has been a recurring theme throughout American history, characterized by a reluctance to engage in international conflicts and a preference for focusing on domestic issues. This doctrine has evolved over time, influenced by various political, social, and economic factors. Isolationism is often viewed through the lens of historical events, particularly during the interwar period of the 1920s and 1930s, when the U.S. adopted a more insular approach to foreign affairs following the devastation of World War I (Urbatsch, 2010; Braumoeller, 2010). The sentiment was rooted in a desire to avoid entanglements that could lead to further conflict, reflecting a broader public opinion that favored non-interventionism (Dodson & Brooks, 2021).
However, the notion of isolationism is complex and multifaceted. It is essential to recognize that isolationism does not imply a complete withdrawal from international affairs; rather, it signifies a selective engagement based on national interests. Scholars argue that American foreign policy has oscillated between isolationism and interventionism, with periods of retreat often followed by renewed involvement in global affairs (Dunn, 2005). This oscillation suggests that isolationism is not merely a static doctrine but a responsive strategy shaped by changing geopolitical dynamics and domestic political pressures.
The hypothesis that the U.S. supports multilateralism for others while perceiving itself as above such frameworks is particularly relevant in this context. American exceptionalism—the belief that the U.S. holds a unique place in the world—often informs this perspective. This ideology can lead to a paradox where the U.S. advocates for multilateral cooperation among other nations while simultaneously prioritizing unilateral action when it aligns with its interests (Ikenberry, 2003; Patman & Southgate, 2016). For instance, during the Obama administration, there was a notable emphasis on multilateralism and diplomacy, yet this approach was often tempered by the underlying belief in American leadership and exceptionalism (Schmitz, 2020; Djurdjevic-Lukic, 2009). This duality reflects a broader tension within U.S. foreign policy, where multilateralism is embraced selectively, depending on the perceived benefits to American interests.
Moreover, the resurgence of isolationist sentiments during the Trump administration highlighted this dichotomy. Trump’s foreign policy was characterized by a retreat from multilateral agreements and a focus on “America First,” which resonated with isolationist voters who felt disillusioned by previous international commitments (Dodson & Brooks, 2021; Xue, 2023). This shift underscored the notion that while the U.S. may advocate for multilateralism in principle, its actions often reveal a preference for unilateralism when it serves national interests, thereby reinforcing the perception of American exceptionalism (Bass, 2009).
19.3 The Future of U.S. Foreign Policy
The question of whether the United States is becoming imperialistic, particularly in light of its interests in territories like Panama and Greenland, invites a critical examination of its foreign policy trajectory and the underlying doctrines that have shaped its approach to international relations. Historically, the U.S. has oscillated between isolationism and interventionism, often influenced by domestic public opinion and strategic interests. This duality raises the hypothesis that while the U.S. may advocate for multilateralism in principle, it often acts unilaterally when it perceives its interests at stake, reflecting an imperialistic inclination.
The case of Panama is illustrative of this trend. The construction of the Panama Canal was a monumental project that not only facilitated maritime trade but also exemplified U.S. interventionist policies in Central America. The U.S. supported Panama’s independence from Colombia in 1903, subsequently securing control over the canal zone. This intervention was justified under the guise of promoting stability and progress in the region, yet it also served U.S. strategic and economic interests, highlighting a pattern of behavior that aligns with imperialistic tendencies Baum (2004)Urbatsch, 2010). The U.S. maintained control over the canal until 1999, which further underscores the long-term implications of its actions in Panama.
Similarly, the interest in Greenland, particularly during the Trump administration’s proposal to purchase the territory from Denmark, reflects a contemporary manifestation of U.S. imperialism. The strategic significance of Greenland, especially in the context of Arctic geopolitics and resource access, has led to renewed U.S. interest in the region. This interest can be seen as part of a broader strategy to assert U.S. influence in the Arctic, a region increasingly contested by global powers (Robinson et al., 2018; Dodson & Brooks, 2021). The rhetoric surrounding the acquisition of Greenland, framed as a move to enhance national security and economic opportunity, resonates with historical patterns of U.S. expansionism.
The hypothesis that the U.S. prefers multilateralism for others while positioning itself above such frameworks is supported by its historical behavior. The U.S. often champions international cooperation and multilateral agreements, yet it frequently reserves the right to act unilaterally when it perceives a threat to its national interests. This selective engagement can be interpreted as a form of exceptionalism, where the U.S. sees itself as a leader entitled to dictate terms in international relations while advocating for collective action among other nations (Blouet, 2004; Quinn, 2007). The Trump administration’s foreign policy, characterized by a retreat from multilateral agreements and a focus on “America First,” exemplifies this trend, as it prioritized unilateral actions that aligned with perceived national interests over collaborative efforts (Irkhin & Moskalenko, 2022; Dueck, 2004).
Moreover, the historical context of American foreign policy reveals a persistent tension between isolationism and interventionism. While isolationist sentiments have periodically influenced public opinion, particularly during the interwar period and in recent years, the U.S. has consistently found ways to engage in international affairs when it aligns with its strategic goals (Lakishyk, 2016; MacMaster, 2004). This suggests that the U.S. may not fully embrace isolationism but rather oscillates between it and a form of imperialism that allows for selective intervention based on national interests.
The U.S. engagement with territories like Panama and Greenland can be interpreted through the lens of imperialism, reflecting a historical pattern of interventionism driven by strategic and economic interests. The hypothesis that the U.S. supports multilateralism for others while considering itself above such frameworks is reinforced by its actions and rhetoric, which often prioritize unilateralism when it serves national objectives. This complex interplay of isolationism, interventionism, and exceptionalism continues to shape U.S. foreign policy in the contemporary geopolitical landscape.
19.4 Differences Between U.S. Actions and Those of Less Democratic Countries
The dynamics of U.S. foreign policy, particularly its interventions in regions like Cuba and its responses to authoritarian regimes globally, raise critical questions about the nature of its actions and the implications for international relations. The U.S. often engages in actions that can be perceived as imperialistic, particularly in the context of its historical interventions and current geopolitical strategies. This section will explore the differences between U.S. actions and those of less democratic countries, the influence of global dictatorships on U.S. behavior, and the role of liberal democracies in addressing these challenges collectively.
The United States, as a self-proclaimed liberal democracy, often justifies its interventions in other nations through the lens of promoting democracy, human rights, and stability. In contrast, less democratic countries typically pursue their interests through coercive means without the same rhetorical commitment to democratic ideals. For instance, while the U.S. may impose sanctions or engage in military interventions under the guise of humanitarianism or democracy promotion, authoritarian regimes may resort to repression and violence to maintain control and suppress dissent (Escribà‐Folch, 2011; Escribà‐Folch & Wright, 2010).
The motivations behind U.S. actions often include strategic interests, economic benefits, and the desire to counter perceived threats from authoritarian regimes. In contrast, authoritarian states may act primarily to consolidate power, suppress opposition, or expand territorial claims without the same justification of promoting democratic values. This distinction highlights a fundamental difference in the underlying ideologies that drive state behavior, even if the outcomes of their actions can sometimes appear similar (Conrad et al., 2014; Xu, 2020).
19.5 The Influence of Global Dictatorships on U.S. Behavior
The presence of dictatorships around the world undoubtedly influences U.S. foreign policy decisions. The U.S. often finds itself in a reactive position, responding to the actions of authoritarian regimes that threaten stability or U.S. interests. For example, the rise of China as an authoritarian power has prompted the U.S. to adopt a more assertive foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific region, viewing China’s expansionism as a direct challenge to its influence (Escribà‐Folch & Wright, 2010).
Moreover, the dynamics of authoritarian regimes can shape U.S. strategies, particularly regarding sanctions and diplomatic engagement. Research indicates that sanctions are often less effective against dictatorships, as these regimes may develop strategies to withstand external pressures, such as co-optation or repression (Escribà‐Folch, 2011; Escribà‐Folch & Wright, 2010). This reality forces the U.S. to reconsider its approach, often leading to a reliance on military intervention or support for opposition movements in authoritarian states.
19.7 From Isolationism to New Exceptionalism
The trajectory from historical isolationism to what might be called a “new exceptionalism” in U.S. policy reflects a reorientation in how America engages with global economic norms. Traditional American isolationism emphasized non-involvement in foreign entanglements, but American exceptionalism has often meant the U.S. sets its own rules. In the 2020s, this exceptionalism is taking on a new form in the economic realm. The conventional capitalist model—focused on GDP growth and profit—has long been critiqued for failing to account for negative externalities such as environmental damage and resource depletion. In economic terms, many social costs of production (pollution, carbon emissions, etc.) are “external” to market pricing, meaning producers and consumers do not pay these costs, which leads to overproduction of harmful goods and market inefficiency. Economists like Arthur Pigou argued decades ago for taxes or regulations to internalize such external costs, precisely because pure market metrics do not optimize societal welfare. With climate change as a prime example of an unpriced externality, many advanced economies have tried to adjust the capitalist model—through carbon taxes, emissions trading systems, or Green New Deal-style investments—to better reflect social and environmental impacts in economic decisions. These “new metrics” of progress, which go beyond GDP to include sustainability, would indeed have led to different policies and outcomes than the status quo.
In the summer of 2025, however, the United States charted a starkly different course – one that underscores a new exceptionalism. A budget reconciliation law passed by the Republican-led Congress (and strongly backed by President Donald Trump) effectively dismantled the core of President Biden’s climate agenda, often colloquially referred to by critics as a “New Green Deal.” This legislation, passed in July 2025, slashed or terminated dozens of programs aimed at clean energy and carbon reduction. It sharply cut short the 30% federal tax credits for solar and wind power (originally set to run until 2032), undermining investments in renewables. At the same time, it expanded support for fossil fuels – mandating new oil and gas leasing on federal lands and waters, preserving tax breaks for drilling and even granting coal producers new tax advantages. Fossil fuel lobbyists praised the bill for furthering an “energy dominance agenda” focused on maximizing oil and gas output. In effect, the U.S. has chosen to “play the global game” by the old rules of unfettered capitalism, doubling down on growth and resource extraction without fully pricing in environmental costs. The U.S. also signaled its retreat from collective climate efforts: the Trump administration began formally withdrawing from the Paris Agreement again, leaving the United States as one of only four nations in the world – and the only OECD country – not party to the accord (the others being Iran, Libya, and Yemen). This stark divergence means the U.S. is now an outlier among advanced economies in foregoing robust climate commitments. It is American exceptionalism in a new guise, with the U.S. asserting that it will prosper on its own terms, even if that means flouting emergent global norms on sustainability.
Critics note that this approach is not optimized for long-term sustainability, yet it may yield America certain short-term strategic advantages. By refusing to internalize environmental externalities (like carbon emissions) in the cost of doing business, U.S. industries enjoy lower immediate costs and fewer regulatory burdens compared to their counterparts in Europe or other developed nations with strict climate policies. This can induce carbon leakage, wherein businesses shift production from countries with high environmental standards to jurisdictions with weaker or no carbon constraints. In other words, factories that might face expensive carbon taxes or regulations in the EU, Japan, or Canada could relocate operations to the United States to benefit from its looser regime. Financial capital, too, may flow toward the more laissez-faire environment of the U.S. — indeed, the country has already been the world’s largest recipient of foreign direct investment, thanks to its huge market and open, innovation-friendly climate. America’s renewed emphasis on traditional energy and industry is expected to reinforce this trend, potentially “sucking in” financial resources from abroad as investors seek to capitalize on U.S. growth opportunities unhampered by carbon costs. Likewise, the United States could become an even stronger magnet for global talent. It already ranks among the top nations in the world for its ability to attract and retain skilled workers, and a booming, deregulated economy may intensify the brain drain from countries where industries are contracting under green transitions. This prospect of regained economic dynamism and innovation capacity is central to the new exceptionalism narrative: the U.S. positions itself as a lone winner in a system of “kinked” capitalism, extracting maximum short-run advantage by adhering to the old metrics of success while others readjust their economies for sustainability.
Of course, this path carries risks and contradictions. America’s go-it-alone strategy on the economy echoes its historical isolationism, yet it also undermines global collective action on issues like climate change — potentially to the detriment of all, including the U.S. in the long run. The “new exceptionalism” may prove unsustainable if climate impacts worsen or if other nations impose carbon border taxes on U.S. goods. Still, in the immediate term, the United States is leveraging its unique stance to pull in wealth and talent, exemplifying an updated form of exceptionalism. It stands virtually alone among industrialized democracies in so fully embracing the uncompromised capitalist playbook, betting that it can reap the benefits of growth-as-usual while others hesitate. In sum, the United States has transitioned from a reluctant world actor to a self-declared exceptional player in the global economy’s latest chapter – one who abides by its own rules in a game where most others are trying to change the rules for the common good. Time will tell whether this bold assertion of economic exceptionalism restores American primacy or simply isolates the U.S. from the next evolution of global capitalism.
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